A side note: for some time now, contrary to what I did for many years, I have not been looking over every immigration decision issued by the Federal Court, and to a large extent have often relied on
@scylla (thank you) to bring attention to new cessation-related cases. I still make an effort to review most FC immigration decisions, subject to occasional lapses, to at least identify those of particular interest in the subjects I follow (cessation, misrepresentation, PR obligations and admissibility, and citizenship applications).
And I make an effort to identify and link here all the published
cessation decisions issued by the FC involving PRs.
BUT I expect there have been some I have overlooked. And, in particular, I have not been diligent in collecting and posting information about cessation actions against non-PRs. The reasoning in these cases is virtually indistinguishable from the reasoning applicable to cessation cases involving PR-refugees. Which probably seems proper . . . unless the application of section 108(1) IRPA is interpreted to apply differently to PR-refugees compared to claimants and those with refugee status without PR status. Applying the same interpretation to both seems proper because the literal letter of the applicable law (as to cessation of refugee or protected person status) is the same except that cessation based on section 108(1)(e) does not affect a PR-refugee's PR status.
In any event, there were two cessation determinations against refugees decided and published last month that I have not previously referenced here:
Alaybiyi v. Canada, 2025 FC 289,
https://canlii.ca/t/k9hmg which is a decision by Justice Strickland allowed review and set aside the cessation decision, to be redetermined by another RPD panel, notwithstanding four trips to the home country
Parczewska v. Canada, 2025 FC 326,
https://canlii.ca/t/k9l28 which is a decision by Justice Pentney upholding cessation (the outcome of this case is disheartening, not because it is wrongly decided, according to applicable law (in situations like this heartless law), but because of the circumstances, this refugee having lived in Canada for twenty years and now an elderly (albeit significantly younger than myself) and vulnerable woman suffering disabling mental and medical conditions)
Another case worth noting, decided and published this month, is about vacating refugee status based on misrepresentation:
The Alaybiyi v. Canada, 2025 FC 289,
https://canlii.ca/t/k9hmg decision warrants a closer look even though Justice Strickland does not address the Charter challenge raised (an issue I expect quite a few are watching, those who are at risk for cessation, on-the-cusp one might say, hoping for signs indicating a reduction if not elimination of their risk), in large part based on allowing the relief requested based on a finding the RPD's decision was not reasonable. This warrants noting because we have not seen any update in regards to the cases pending that are based on Charter challenges (discussed here above, last year) and, so far anyway, it appears that Charter challenges are not getting much if any traction . . . particularly not before RPD.
In regards to the latter, Justice Strickland observed that the RPD does not have "
the power" to address legal questions arising out of the application of the provision (section 46(1)(c.1) IRPA) which automatically terminates PR status upon a determination of cessation. The automatic termination of PR status is (as best I can grasp) the primary focus of Charter challenges, given how harsh the consequences are. The RPD's role in cessation, however, is limited to determining if protected person status is ceased, no jurisdiction to address what might be considered collateral consequences.
(Somewhat akin to a criminal court handling a driving while impaired charge . . . the criminal court only has jurisdiction to deal with the criminal charges and sentencing under the criminal law, not with the potential collateral impact of inadmissibility for serious criminality that can derive from a driving while impaired offence pursuant to IRPA.)
The more interesting aspect of Justice Strickland's decision, and more practically relevant (unless the FCs and more significantly the FCA rule in a way giving effect to the Charter challenges), has to do with the issue that really makes the difference in the cessation based on reavailment cases: the question of intent. In this case, unlike most of the cessation cases during the past two or three years, Justice Strickland does not give the RPD a pass based on its references/description of the factors considered, but rather requiring the RPD to "
meaningfully engage with certain factors factors that were highly relevant." In particular:
[48] Here, “[t]he problem with the RPD’s reasoning is not that it failed to mention most of the relevant facts. Rather, it failed to show how the key facts, including the measures the Applicant took to protect herself, were weighed in the assessment of her subjective intention” . . .
Frankly I have some difficulty with Justice Strickland's analysis even though I largely agree with the conclusions. And for Oladele Bamidel Alabiyi, in particular, it still looks like it will be a challenge to persuade the next RPD panel that she has sufficiently rebutted the presumption of reavailment by rebutting the presumption of intent to reavail. That is, persuading Justice Strickland that the RPD failed to reasonably weigh the evidence as to intent only gets Alabiyi another hearing before another RPD. To avoid cessation Alabiyi still needs to persuade a RPD panel she did not intend to reavail home country protection despite the number of trips and duration of stays in the home country.
For those facing cessation it is a practical problem: how to overcome the presumption of intent to reavail based on voluntary actions amounting to actual reavailment (voluntarily returning to home country using home country passport).
Leading to . . . well, some editorial commentary . . . and the elephant in the room, generally not spoken of or even, typically, acknowledged, even though it is a big and awkward beast, far more than a mere cloud of suspicion of misrepresentation in regards to the need for protection itself: for those who travel to their home country, much as
@canuck78 referenced above (even for those who have acquired Canadian citizenship and who can travel to their home country without actually availing themselves of home country protection), many harbour at least some suspicion if not an overt inference that such travel indicates there was no need for protection itself from the beginning. That is, that there was misrepresentation made in claiming the need for protection.
And, frankly, that is malarkey. As much as the presumption of reavailment may be appropriate when applied to refugees who are non-Canadians, once a refugee has become a Canadian (that is, once they are a Canadian PR and no longer a Foreign National), it makes little, if any sense, to presume merely visiting the home country constitutes an intent to reavail that country's protection, and especially so if the PR-refugee is taking precautions to protect themselves during such visits and is otherwise not settling or working there, engaging in political activities, but rather is keeping a low profile while relying on their PR status, one might say (at least if they are a fan of old Western films), to "
get out of dodge" if and when things get hot.
Not that there is any indication this or any other prospective government (following the coming election) is at all likely to sort this stuff out and make revisions to the law that would make more sense and avoid the legal technicalities, pretzels in reasoning, that force the parties to navigate complex facts and evidence burdened with unrealistic, impractical presumptions.
