Other Stuff . . . Esfand and Camayo for example . . .
So at least at one point in time the guidance was that some family members could lose their PR status through cessation of a parent . . . but . . . Esfand . . .
However as per Camayo an inland refugee's dependents have their own individual risk assessments done, and so are refugees who can lose status. (According to
https://zachmorgensternlaw.ca/2023/05/31/how-cases-like-galindo-camayo-protect-refugees-from-having-their-status-stripped/ the FC ordered that Camayo should keep refugee status anyways, primarily because Camayo hired private security as a sign that Camayo wasn't trying to obtain the protection of another state - and they point to a similar case where the person stayed at hotels under protection by NATO forces as a sign that protection of the state was not actually sought. Camayo is on appeal.)
Regarding the issue at hand, the potential impact on a dependent if there is cessation of a parent's status, you are spot on noting that it can (or at least it might) depend on the path to status in Canada for the particular individual PR, and in particular whether they are themselves a Convention refugee or protected person.
That said, while not the particular issue here, the Federal Court of Appeal (per a decision authored by Justice Donald Rennie), just to be clear, has definitively ruled that the cessation provisions apply to protected persons regardless of the means by which protection is granted, that there is no reason why the principle of reavailment and its associated criteria should vary according to the route by which status as a protected person is originally obtained. This is the Siddiqui v. Canada, 2016 FCA 134,
https://canlii.ca/t/grsb2 decision, which I have cited and discussed in multiple posts. Note that unlike Federal Court decisions, which carry a lot of weight but are not necessarily binding precedent, a decision by the Federal Court of Appeal is binding precedent.
An important aspect of this, however, is that so far as I have seen there is more than a little uncertainty about how this applies to accompanying dependents, in regards to what the law itself is, let alone how it should be applied, and far more so in regards to how this issue is approached by CBSA, IRCC, the RPD, and the Federal Courts. This is too weedy and too uncertain for forum analysis, let alone guessing. I am not sure that even a well-experienced lawyer can offer a definite take, but a duly experienced immigration lawyer should provide more and better information and guidance . . . and, importantly, do so relative to the particular individual's specific situation.
I probably sound like a broken record, reiterating "
lawyer-up" whenever a complex issue comes up. But in regards to potential cessation, the risks are so high, the potential consequences so severe, it really is important to repeatedly admonish those potentially in the cross-hairs of a cessation investigation (let alone the subject of a cessation action) that this is lawyer-up time.
As for the Esfand and Camayo cases in particular . . . I have referenced, linked, and discussed these cases at length in this topic.
Re Esfand, that is Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Esfand, 2015 FC 1190,
https://canlii.ca/t/glrm0 also see a comparable decision, the Gezik decision: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Heidari Gezik, 2015 FC 1268,
https://canlii.ca/t/gm3b8
Esfand is a decision I discussed above in six different posts back in 2016, and multiple times since, including in two posts just this last April (2024), where I emphasized that for PRs who obtained status as a dependent versus as a primary applicant for protection, that is definitely a question for which a lawyer is a far better resource. I stated:
. . . my sense (this is
NOT an expert opinion) is that the exception distinguished in the Esfand
https://canlii.ca/t/glrm0 and Gezik
https://canlii.ca/t/gm3b8 decisions will
NOT insulate dependent PR-refugees from cessation.
Beyond that this gets weedy, and at least a little cloudy, and unfortunately the rather casual brushing aside of this issue in the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Camayo
https://canlii.ca/t/jndkg fails to clearly illuminate if the exception distinguished in the Esfand and Gezik decisions might, still, insulate some PR-refugees from cessation.
Remember that in Camayo the court stated:
. . . this Court has previously held that a minor who obtains refugee protection as a dependant under a parent’s claim is indeed subject to the same immigration consequences as the parent claimant.
On its face that would seem to indicate the distinction in Esfand and Gezik will not insulate the PR-refugee who obtained status as a dependent.
As for Camayo, I have addressed both the FC and FCA Camayo decisions more than two dozen times here, at-length in some posts.
For reference:
The FC decision is Camayo v. Canada, 2020 FC 213,
https://canlii.ca/t/j54n9
The FCA decision is Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50,
https://canlii.ca/t/jndkg
It is of course the latter ruling which establishes binding precedent in cessation proceedings.
Note that a good deal of caution should be exercised before relying on the blog by Zach Morgenstern, which you reference and link, notwithstanding its reasonable and fair take on the FCA Camayo decision at the time. I do not know the date of that blog post, but it appears the forecast shift toward more leniency has been knocked off course by unfriendly winds. In particular, as many, many cessation cases decided since the FCA Camayo decision unfortunately illuminate, neither Camayo nor the other case referenced by Morgenstern, Hamid . . . that is Hamid v. Canada, 2022 FC 1541,
https://canlii.ca/t/jt2jx (which may be one of the few FC cessation decisions I have not previously cited and linked in this topic) . . . have much moderated the Minister, the RPD, or most of the Federal Court justices involved in these cases, with just a few exceptions.
The main relief valve in those decisions revolves around negating the presumption of intent, giving weight to the PR-refugees lack of subjective knowledge of what constitutes reavailment and its potential effect, efforts to avoid risks rather than rely on government protection during travel in the home country, and considering the severity of the consequences of losing status. Case after case, most of which I cite, link, and discuss here in this forum, acknowledge these factors, ostensibly giving them due consideration, but then proceed to uphold cessation, upholding the RPD in its finding that the PR-refugee nonetheless has failed to rebut the presumption of intent to reavail. There are some cases going the other way, but far more have upheld cessation and in many of these cases there was just ONE trip to the home country.
A better analysis of Camayo was written by immigration lawyer Justin Toh, which is here:
https://cila.co/refugee-cessation-the-year-since-galindo-camayo/ . . . but it too is dated (it notes, by the way, that Toh's colleagues said the IRB was referencing Camayo but misinterpreting it).
A bit of a quibble for clarity:
You state "the FC ordered that Camayo should keep refugee status anyways."
With some exceptions, not applicable to Camayo, the FC does not have jurisdiction to make such an order. The Camayo FC order, which was in effect upheld in the appeal to the FCA, set aside the RPD determination of cessation and ordered the matter "
remitted to a differently constituted RPD for redetermination." Which is the typical favourable outcome in the appeal of cessation. I do not know the outcome of the case after that, which could range from the Minister electing to withdraw the application for cessation to the RPD rehearing the case and deciding against the government, no cessation, or another determination of cessation. While I do not know the outcome of what, in effect, was a remand for a new trial for Camayo, we have seen other cases (and I discuss some of these in the previous pages of this thread) in which the PR-refugee won an appeal but was again determined to have reavailed home country protection, and appealed that and lost the appeal the second time around (I vaguely recall there might have been one that eventually lost the third time around -- winning the appeal twice, but after a third RPD panel determined cessation, also lost in the appeal).
Take-Aways:
The main take-away is that the cases subsequent to Camayo do not indicate a trend toward leniency in applying cessation to PR-refugees. (I have previously editorialized above why this is disappointing.) A couple of corollary take-aways is the importance of not engaging in actions that will support an allegation of reavailment, and for those who have already engaged in actions that constitute a presumption of reavailment, the importance of avoiding any further activity that will trigger cessation investigation or constitute further evidence of reavailment. And finally, the overriding take-away: for those affected, those who have traveled to their home country (even just once), best to get input from a good lawyer before engaging in any further transactions with IRCC or CBSA, and that includes not applying for citizenship, at least not before getting help from a lawyer.