Another Update:
Revisiting Camayo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 213
https://canlii.ca/t/j54n9 and the Federal Court of Appeal decision 2022 FCA 50
https://canlii.ca/t/jndkg
Camayo is a significant case because just this last month (March 29, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal upheld Federal Court Justice Fuhrer's decision to remand to the RPD to determine the PR/refugee's "
intent" and the FCA answered the certified questions related to that. Camayo had actually obtained multiple passports, used them multiple times, and returned to the home country five times, and while the RPD proceeded with cessation and the IAD upheld cessation of status (I believe that IAD decision is here
https://canlii.ca/t/j69pj . . . caveat, I am not absolutely certain, since the names are redacted, like they are in most of these kinds of cases in the IAD, but I am quite sure this is the official IAD decision in the Camayo case).
The IAD had concluded:
. . . the culmination of the travel to Colombia on numerous occasions to visit her sick father and for a humanitarian mission, as well as her use of her Colombian passport to travel for vacation purposes to other countries, demonstrates the voluntariness, intent, and actual re-availment for this Respondent.
Among multiple factors that Justice Fuhrer cited the IAD failed to consider, as relevant to determining whether Camayo's actions constituted "voluntarily" reavailing herself of home country's protection, was in regards to her subjective understanding and knowledge, in regards which the FCA ruled:
Yes it is . . . "reasonable for the RPD to rely upon evidence of the refugee’s lack of subjective [let alone any] knowledge that use of a passport confers diplomatic protection to rebut the presumption that a refugee who acquires and travels on a passport issued by their country of origin has intended to avail themselves of that state’s protection."
PR/refugees should NOT take much if any comfort from the Camayo decision. While it appears likely she will not lose her PR status (her actual fate still to be decided upon remand for reconsideration), her case illustrates the extent to which cessation can be and is prosecuted DESPITE a ton of equitable factors in her favour (not the least of which were the reasons for her trips to the home country, to visit and assist a sick parent and another time as part of a humanitarian project to provide help to children in need there).
MORE REPRESENTATIVE of the typical cessation case, another decision from just last month, is here Iqbal v. Canada, 2022 FC 387
https://canlii.ca/t/jndjd or
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2022/2022fc387/2022fc387.html . . . another case triggered by a citizenship application. And it was indeed Ms. Iqbal's citizenship application which gave the government the evidence she had traveled to the home country, triggering the referral to CBSA, and in turn resulting in the cessation of her protected person status, automatically terminating her PR status, and rendering her ineligible for citizenship,
There is a little older IAD decision which I do not think has been cited and linked here but which is worth citing and linking . . .
https://canlii.ca/t/jcjmc . . . The Panel's decision echoes scores of others and is all too familiar to those who follow this subject:
She was issued an Iranian passport in 2011, after she was granted protection and permanent residence in Canada. She traveled to Iran twice on that passport. In so doing, she received the “diplomatic protection” of Iran enabling her to travel as a citizen of Iran. . . . Accordingly, I find that the respondent has actually obtained protection from Iran merely by travelling there on an Iranian passport and accepting the protection of the Iranian authorities throughout her time there.
It is worth citing in part because it further reflects the recognition of how severe the consequences are, the Panel concluding:
This result will be very distressing for the respondent – particularly, because she strikes me as an honest person who has lived under the Sword of Damocles since 2014. . . . but the law affords me no jurisdiction to consider such grounds for relief in this proceeding.
That IAD panel more or less encouraged the individual to obtain legal counsel to pursue the possibility of other options . . . which points back to the Camayo case and perhaps pursuing a defense based on no intent to reavail.
