Cessation case. Renewal of home country passport + multiple trips to home country.
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2022/2022fc1595/2022fc1595.html
As always, updated citations to relevant decisions is appreciated.
This is not actually a cessation decision, but a collateral proceeding which . . . well, that gets into legalese weeds . . . the decision in Gnanapragasam v. Canada, 2022 FC 1595
https://canlii.ca/t/jt4xd is likely of far more interest to lawyers and those engaged in related jurisprudence than those potentially subject to cessation proceedings. The decision rejecting a motion to stay the RPD acting against Gnanapragasam (I'll refer to him as "
Jude G") illuminates very little about grounds for cessation or the procedure.
It is one more case illustrating that for those PR-refugees who have engaged in actions which could constitute reavailment of home country protection, there is a real risk an application for citizenship could trigger cessation proceedings. It is not certain that is what happened, but given the chronological sequence it looks very much like Jude G's application for citizenship is what triggered CBSA's commencement of proceedings before the RPD to cease Jude G's protected person status.
This warrants a reminder:
PR-refugees who have obtained or used a home country passport (for travel to anywhere), and especially those who traveled to the home country, would be prudent to STOP using the passport, NOT renew any such passport, and NOT travel to the home country . . . AND THEN WAIT a full five more years, five years AFTER the last home country passport has expired, and wait at least five years since the last trip to the home country, before applying for citizenship. So that when they apply for citizenship the obligation to report travel during the five year "eligibility period," and present passports that could have been used for travel during that period, does not require them to give IRCC information documenting the actions which could constitute reavailment. STOP doing things that can be considered reavailment and then WAIT, WAIT, WAIT.
The case also illustrates the nature and scope of efforts to find ways to get relief from cessation in the Federal Court. Some might see what the lawyers and the The Canadian Council for Refugees have done, here, as
grasping at straws.
Severity of Impact -- Cessation Consequences:
One aspect of cessation I had given little attention, and to a significant extent I have been overlooking, is that not only does cessation automatically terminate the individual's PR status (this is the operative effect of Section 46(c.1) IRPA), it also makes the individual INADMISSIBLE (Section 40.1 IRPA) . My observations about how severe, often harsh and even draconian, the consequences of cessation are have typically focused on the automatic loss of PR status. I overlooked Section 40.1.
Section 40.1 is discussed in Jude G's case in the context of challenging its constitutional validity. (I'm guessing that's a long shot . . . and apparently is subject to a
Kafkaesque Catch-22 . . . something about the requisites for challenging this cannot be met before a cessation determination, but a cessation determination eliminates standing to make the challenge, or something legalese-complicated like that -- that is, something like: unless there has been a cessation decision, a constitutional challenge of 40.1 is not appropriate, but if there has been a cessation decision, a constitutional challenge of 40.1 is not available.)
The impact of Section 40.1 is only incidentally referenced in Jude G's case. But its import is obvious: this means, for example, if the PR-refugee is married to a Canadian (citizen or PR), they are NOT eligible to be sponsored because they are inadmissible. Apparently there is no family reunion for a former refugee whose protected person status has been ceased. I do not know what relief from this might be available, if any, or when.