H. Some scandals CSIS has been involved with.
Even though CSIS is a professional agency that is tasked with the security screening of prospective immigrants, it does not stop its activities there. Even after an applicant is granted PR status, CSIS continues to monitor his activities, as another security screening is done when the PR applies for citizenship. CSIS, from the time someone applies to enter Canada until long after they have citizenship is involved in surveilling, gathering information, creating files, developing profiles, writing and passing on secret reports. There have been frequent complaints about general harassment, and also about the specific behaviour of CSIS. CSIS agents have been known to show up at an individual’s door late at night. As SIRC reports indicate, CSIS agents regularly fail to inform the individual of their right to have an attorney present.
According to the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations (NCCAR), students of Arab origin are being approached by CSIS agents on campus for questioning. They have reportedly been threatened with deportation and revocation of their status if they fail to provide information about community members (“In The Shadow of The Law”, a report by the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG), 2003).
Toronto immigration lawyer Faisal Kutty elaborates, “Showing up at homes and workplaces unannounced; offering money and favors for “information”; intimidating and threatening newcomers; inquiring about a person’s religiosity; and discouraging people from engaging lawyers are some of the recurring themes that I have come across from clients.” (Faisal Kutty, “The Dirty Work of Canadian Intelligence”, April 2004)
The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) has distributed tens of thousands of “Know Your Rights” guides and organized workshops across the country to help community members deal with CSIS and the RCMP. A community survey conducted in 2004 by CAIR-CAN reports that security officials were using, “troubling tactics” such as “discouraging legal representation, aggressive and threatening behaviour, threats of arrest pursuant to the antiterrorism act, visits at work, intrusive and irrelevant questionning, improper identification, informant solicitation, and interrogation of a minor.” (CAIR-CAN, “Presumption of Guilt”, 2004).
In the past CSIS has been involved in the following scandals:
Maher Arar. Documents divulged in the Arar inquiry reveal that CSIS believed “the U.S. would like to get Arar to Jordan where they can have their way with him,” as early as two days after Mr. Arar was deported by the US to Jordan, and then on to Syria, where he was tortured and imprisonned for nearly a year. According to the Arar inquiry report, CSIS nevertheless visited Syria and met with Syrian intelligence agents during Arar’s incarceration, even passing on questions to be posed to Arar. The information Arar provided under torture was then passed on to CSIS, who in turn passed it on to other Canadian authorities. CSIS's position during this period was that Arar should not return to Canada. Syrian authorities were aware of the position of CSIS, despite Canada's official demand that Arar should be released immediately. Arar is one of several individuals who have gone public with similar stories, including Benamar Benatta, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, Muayyed Nureddin and Abousfian Abdelrazik. The report on this is available at
http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/402/SECU/Reports/RP4004074/securp03/securp03-e.pdf
Security certificate cases. Security certificates are a “legal” way of doing the same thing that was done to Arar, Benatta, Almalki, El Maati, Nureddin and Abdelrazik: on the basis of secret suspicions, attempting to send people to places where it is known they will be tortured and in the meantime keeping them in indefinite detention. CSIS is the government agency which prepares security certificate cases. Even within the fundamentally flawed framework of the certificate, CSIS has been mired in several scandals, including the destruction of evidence, and possible involvement in media leaks. CSIS has been accused of using information obtained under coercion and torture in these and similar cases. For example, CSIS is known to have introduced information obtained from Abu Zubaydah-the poster boy of the CIA’s “black sites” programme-into the Charkaoui case. CSIS continues to deny that it uses information obtained under torture, but in November 2005, SIRC SIRC reported that CSIS was in no position to make "an absolute assurance" to the government that information it receives from allied spy agencies is not obtained as a result of torture. What is a security certificate -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_certificate
Air India. CSIS destroyed key wiretap evidence and those responsible were not brought to justice. A suspected CSIS mole, Surjan Singh Gill, was identified by the RCMP as one of six main suspects in the bombing. The RCMP believed that he had the explosives and airline ticket with him shortly before two bombs were apparently checked onto flights in Vancouver. Gill left Canada in 2000 and has never been charged. (Globe and Mail, 4 June 2003). More on Air India Case -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_India_Flight_182
Bhupinder S. Liddar. CSIS was caught lying to SIRC [Security Intelligence Review Committee] (in SIRC’s words, the agency “purposefully misled” SIRC in order to "suppress information that was embarrassing to the Service") to cover up its errors in the Liddar case. SIRC reported that CSIS had conducted a “hasty, slipshod investigation” and had ‘a regrettable’ attitude that supporting Arab causes can be suspicious.” (Globe and Mail, 14 September 2005).
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/csis-vows-changes-amid-criticism/article986548/
Targeting Unions. During the 1980s and 1990s, CSIS spied on the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW). Former CSIS officer John Farrell confessed that, as CUPW engaged in the difficult negotiations leading to the strike of 1991, he and fellow officers prepared dossiers on "troublesome" CUPW leaders. They sought and received authorization to intercept every piece of mail delivered to the homes of targetted labour organizers and to inspect their garbage. They illegally planted a listening device in a postal station and stole keys from a postal depot to break into apartment buildings and mail boxes (Andrew Mitrovica, Covert Entry: Spies, Lies and Crimes Inside Canada's Secret Service). CSIS has always denied these activities. CUPW was not the only union of interest to CSIS. Marc-André Boivin infiltrated Quebec’s CSN for 15 years - first for the RCMP and then for CSIS. Boivin was involved in making bomb threats during a hotel strike.
Heritage Front. Grant Bristow, one of the founders of the neo-Nazi group Heritage Front was employed for five years by CSIS. According to an article by Bill Dunphy of the Toronto Sun, Bristow was supposed to be working as a mole for CSIS, while serving as the intelligence chief and co-director of security for the Heritage Front. However, his active role in hate activities has raised questions. Bristow allegedly ran a programme of harassment against anti-racists in Canada, and provided the Front with personal information on them. More on Heritage Front -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heritage_Front
I hope you found this information useful. I try to answer as many questions as I can, but it is humanly impossible for me to answer specific application questions for all applicants. So lets keep this thread to discuss BGC and what other forum members have experienced.
If you have any specific questions for me, please use the threads in my signature.
Thank you.
