I have had an opportunity to review some of the media stories and in looking at media accounts of the legal challenge initiated in August by CARL (which means essentially by Lorne Waldman), those indicate, apparently, a challenge based on Section 6 in the Charter, claiming that the intent to reside clause breaches the right of citizens to enter and leave Canada freely.
So it appears to be true that Waldman and I disagree. That said, I would put this one in the same category as Galati's initial claim against the grant of Royal Assent itself, another easy one to predict. As in easily dismissed as unfounded.
That Waldman is still advancing this is both a bit of a surprise and a disappointment. There really is no substantive basis for this challenge. The intent clause has no impact at all on citizens and thus in no way impairs the Charter 6 Right of citizens to enter and leave Canada.
I cannot explain why Waldman would still include this among the other challenges which are at the least arguably cogent based on substantive law.
While similarly just one other person's opinion, consider that expressed by Andrew Griffith, a former Director General within CIC, in The Hill Times and the piece is also published in his blog "Multicultural Meanderings" (see older posts at Multicultural Meanderings, looking for the post titled "Citizenship: getting the balance right" dated 2015/10/06 ), where he describes changes which can "only be achieved through legislation. These include abolishing the 'intent to reside' provision [and] restoring pre-Permanent Resident time credit towards citizenship . . . " (among others). No matter how bad these are as policy, they are not invalid, and thus can only be changed by an Act of Parliament. (I refer to Andrew's blog and writings because they are a good example of carefully drawn and well informed views based on reasoned analysis and a depth of experience in this area.)
This is not to say there are not valid criticisms of the intent to reside clause, many of which have been discussed at length in multiple topics here, including what I have posted as to some serious concerns (particularly as to the potential risk for an abuse of discretion in how this requirement might in practice be implemented). But those are not about its validity.
I have read many criticisms of Bill C-24, including those by lawyers, including Waldman's in 2014, and more by law students. None have advanced any substantive ground as to why the intent to reside clause is invalid, at least none other than the (clearly erroneous) conclusion that it somehow improperly restrains the freedom of movement protected by the Charter, despite the simple fact it does not affect the mobility rights of citizens in any respect.
And to be frank, I would hope better from Waldman. Many of the other issues regarding other aspects of what was implemented through Bill C-24 (especially those centralizing profound decision-making power in the Minister and otherwise affecting procedural rights) raise real concerns demanding careful judicial examination. I always cringe when I see good cases undermined by including unfounded and easily rejected arguments. Too often the flawed arguments grab all the attention and the more serious issues get overlooked. This is in large part what happened in the public debate, to the extent there was some, regarding Bill C-24 while it was still a pending Bill in Parliament . . . way too much attention was focused on red herring arguments about the impact of the intent to reside clause on citizens, with virtually no real consideration for its actual impact on the process of evaluating the qualifications of those seeking Canadian citizenship.
From various sources, going back some to the early 2014 criticisms authored by Waldman, as best I can sort out how it is that, according to Waldman, the intent to reside clause impairs the mobility rights of citizens, it is something of a vagueness argument claiming that the clause is ambiguous and thus could be used to revoke the citizenship of a naturalized citizen who moves abroad, as a citizen, based on having misrepresented his intent. While there are many flaws in this argument (the clause is actually not ambiguous for example), ultimately citizenship can only be revoked for misrepresentation if there was in fact misrepresentation. If there was misrepresentation, few would disagree that the proper outcome is any other than revocation. The fact the person lives abroad later in time, after becoming a citizen, is not the ground for revoking citizenship. Misrepresentation is.
At best, what the argument depends on is the proposition that, given the clause's ambiguity (despite there being none), the risk of being falsely accused of misrepresentation due to leaving Canada is substantial enough a risk it chills the mobility of naturalized citizens and thus constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on their mobility rights. The argument is dependent on an over-extended daisy-chain of remote possibilities way, way short of what is required to make the case that the clause is unconstitutional. Here too, no particular expertise in Canadian constitutional law is necessary to see the obvious outcome.
The other issues raised, though, demand examination and careful consideration. Again, I cannot begin to guess how the courts will rule regarding matters like the centralizing of decision-making in the Minister, diminishing the role of the courts, and provisions to revoke citizenship on the gounds of criminal acts committed while a citizen. There are many tough questions underlying these issues.
The validity of the intent to reside clause is not a tough issue.
So it appears to be true that Waldman and I disagree. That said, I would put this one in the same category as Galati's initial claim against the grant of Royal Assent itself, another easy one to predict. As in easily dismissed as unfounded.
That Waldman is still advancing this is both a bit of a surprise and a disappointment. There really is no substantive basis for this challenge. The intent clause has no impact at all on citizens and thus in no way impairs the Charter 6 Right of citizens to enter and leave Canada.
I cannot explain why Waldman would still include this among the other challenges which are at the least arguably cogent based on substantive law.
While similarly just one other person's opinion, consider that expressed by Andrew Griffith, a former Director General within CIC, in The Hill Times and the piece is also published in his blog "Multicultural Meanderings" (see older posts at Multicultural Meanderings, looking for the post titled "Citizenship: getting the balance right" dated 2015/10/06 ), where he describes changes which can "only be achieved through legislation. These include abolishing the 'intent to reside' provision [and] restoring pre-Permanent Resident time credit towards citizenship . . . " (among others). No matter how bad these are as policy, they are not invalid, and thus can only be changed by an Act of Parliament. (I refer to Andrew's blog and writings because they are a good example of carefully drawn and well informed views based on reasoned analysis and a depth of experience in this area.)
This is not to say there are not valid criticisms of the intent to reside clause, many of which have been discussed at length in multiple topics here, including what I have posted as to some serious concerns (particularly as to the potential risk for an abuse of discretion in how this requirement might in practice be implemented). But those are not about its validity.
I have read many criticisms of Bill C-24, including those by lawyers, including Waldman's in 2014, and more by law students. None have advanced any substantive ground as to why the intent to reside clause is invalid, at least none other than the (clearly erroneous) conclusion that it somehow improperly restrains the freedom of movement protected by the Charter, despite the simple fact it does not affect the mobility rights of citizens in any respect.
And to be frank, I would hope better from Waldman. Many of the other issues regarding other aspects of what was implemented through Bill C-24 (especially those centralizing profound decision-making power in the Minister and otherwise affecting procedural rights) raise real concerns demanding careful judicial examination. I always cringe when I see good cases undermined by including unfounded and easily rejected arguments. Too often the flawed arguments grab all the attention and the more serious issues get overlooked. This is in large part what happened in the public debate, to the extent there was some, regarding Bill C-24 while it was still a pending Bill in Parliament . . . way too much attention was focused on red herring arguments about the impact of the intent to reside clause on citizens, with virtually no real consideration for its actual impact on the process of evaluating the qualifications of those seeking Canadian citizenship.
From various sources, going back some to the early 2014 criticisms authored by Waldman, as best I can sort out how it is that, according to Waldman, the intent to reside clause impairs the mobility rights of citizens, it is something of a vagueness argument claiming that the clause is ambiguous and thus could be used to revoke the citizenship of a naturalized citizen who moves abroad, as a citizen, based on having misrepresented his intent. While there are many flaws in this argument (the clause is actually not ambiguous for example), ultimately citizenship can only be revoked for misrepresentation if there was in fact misrepresentation. If there was misrepresentation, few would disagree that the proper outcome is any other than revocation. The fact the person lives abroad later in time, after becoming a citizen, is not the ground for revoking citizenship. Misrepresentation is.
At best, what the argument depends on is the proposition that, given the clause's ambiguity (despite there being none), the risk of being falsely accused of misrepresentation due to leaving Canada is substantial enough a risk it chills the mobility of naturalized citizens and thus constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on their mobility rights. The argument is dependent on an over-extended daisy-chain of remote possibilities way, way short of what is required to make the case that the clause is unconstitutional. Here too, no particular expertise in Canadian constitutional law is necessary to see the obvious outcome.
The other issues raised, though, demand examination and careful consideration. Again, I cannot begin to guess how the courts will rule regarding matters like the centralizing of decision-making in the Minister, diminishing the role of the courts, and provisions to revoke citizenship on the gounds of criminal acts committed while a citizen. There are many tough questions underlying these issues.
The validity of the intent to reside clause is not a tough issue.