You both renewed your home country passport and returned to your home country. IRCC/CBSA can certainly say this is reavailement and pursue cessation. I have no idea if they will do this or not. In terms of what you should do, probably best to get legal advice and get a consult with an immigration lawyer.
Refugee status cessation and PRs applying for citizenship
- Thread starter dpenabill
- Start date
Thank you for your reply.
I am really worried about these notes and do not know the CR-3783 code means.
Date: 2023/06/15
office: Montreal call center
TEXT: MP office status inquiry (no action). Provided TRV x2 refusal rationale. FC1 is under review. SPR returned to the Country of persecution on possibly two occasions. CR-3783
Also if you can suggest any good lawyer in GTA area? I would be grateful for your help
I've never worked with an immigration lawyer. Wait for recommendations from others.
The Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1071 https://canlii.ca/t/jzgzp decision is very much in line with most of those being seen now. Does not offer much insight into the risk of cessation for a PR who has only minimally engaged in conduct that will support cessation.
I have not looked closely at the "vacation" side of things, and may later, but a lot of the defenses that might save a PR-refugee from cessation will not help much, if at all, in a vacation proceeding based on misrepresentation. Will try to look more at this part of things later.
You have done a very good job outlining the situation. But as @scylla has noted, this is Get-A-Lawyer time. Or, wait and take your chances and get a lawyer if and when cessation proceedings are started. I cannot offer any suggestions about which lawyer to hire.
Whether to pursue a Green Card, and how that would go, I cannot say, I do not know.
"If they really start doing the cessation what should I do?"
If you do not hire a lawyer soon, you definitely should if and when cessation proceedings are underway.
In the meantime: no more using the home country passport. No more travel to the home country. And so on.
By the way: the I did not know, no one told me defense, does not seem to get much traction . . . perhaps I did not understand might work better. Obviously only go with whichever is true. But most of what we see suggests that the government is not buying claims that the information about not returning to home country et al was not provided.
Please keep us informed about how this goes. Good luck with it.
thank you for your suggestion. If I get a lawyer now can he do something? because I don't know if they will initiate the cessation or not. I am just guessing now.
That is, it seems there is a large number of PR-refugees who do things like obtain a home country passport and use it to travel, including travel to the home country, among whom only some face cessation. Thus, there appears to be a significant gap between who is subjected to cessation proceedings compared to who has engaged in actions which could lead to cessation.
You are clearly among the latter. Passport plus travel leads to a presumption of reavailment (which is grounds for cessation).
You also appear to have been flagged (high likelihood you are flagged). After just one trip, and second noted. That does not necessarily mean a cessation investigation has been started, let alone cessation proceedings triggered. But it appears your trips caught CBSA's attention and it has noted them, so at the very least you are on their radar.
The majority, a big majority of the cases we see, typically involve more trips or longer trips. But there have been some involving just a couple trips and, the big reason we have a problem even guessing how things will go, we see just a tiny sliver of actual cases.
So, whether you will be subject to cessation proceedings is very, very difficult to forecast. This is one area in which an experienced immigration lawyer, one who handles refugee cases, might be useful. I do not know what such lawyers charge for a consultation these days (skip free consultations, which are worth little if any more than what you pay for). I do not know whether or not a lawyer can reliably say what the risk or probability is for you. But an experienced lawyer should have a lot more exposure to actual cases, to the government's actual practices, than anyone here. Which should mean they probably have more insight into what the odds are.
Whether it is worth the cost for a consultation now rather than waiting to see if cessation proceedings are initiated is a personal matter, depending of course on things like your finances.
Whether it is worth starting a relationship with a qualified lawyer, someone you could turn to on short notice to get going on your behalf, is likewise a personal choice, likewise depending on whether you can afford it.
A looming difficulty is that CBSA and IRCC seem to take their time, a lot of time, deciding if to proceed and when to proceed. There is no statute of limitations, so the government has no time limit on how long it takes to investigate the possibility of cessation. As you could see if you looked at the case that @scylla linked (also linked by me in response), in that case the PR-refugee traveled to the home country between 2011 and 2017. Her cessation case did not go before the RPD until October 2021. We have seen many, many that took longer, many years.
I understand the difficult circumstances compelling your travel to the home country, and the reasons for those trips can be a defense that helps a PR-refugee avoid cessation. But having compelling reasons for the trips is not guaranteed to block cessation. Tough situation. Best I can offer, apart from seeing a lawyer, getting more information and some professional advice, is avoid any further use of the passport, and for sure (if possible) any further travel using the passport. Again, hoping this goes well . . . even if, unfortunately, it may takes years of no news to know if it is indeed going well.
Some follow-up in regards to Wu v. Canada and observations about another cessation and vacation decision Ede v. Canada
This is to offer some follow-up in regards to the Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1071 https://canlii.ca/t/jzgzp decision and the "vacation" of status side of things. As I previously alluded, a lot of the defenses that might save a PR-refugee from cessation will not help much, if at all, in a vacation proceeding based on misrepresentation.
Additionally, there is a reference in the Wu decision to an earlier cessation case I have not referenced in the forum before, so far as I can recall: Ede v. Canada, 2021 FC 804, https://canlii.ca/t/jhbqm which is a decision by Justice Norris. This is now a two year old decision but is worth reviewing for a couple reasons. One reason is that the cessation action itself was, apparently, triggered by just four trips to the home country, at least two of which (and perhaps three) occurred before the change in law, that is, at a time when a PR-refugee's trips to the home country had no legal consequences that would affect PR status.
The other is that like Wu, there is a vacation of status decision involved as well, but in this Ede case that was set aside.
Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1071 https://canlii.ca/t/jzgzp
In particular, in addition to cessation, Guo Ying Wu was determined to have made misrepresentations constituting grounds to vacate the decision allowing her refugee protection under Section 109 IRPA . . . see statute here: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-2.5/page-13.html#h-275723
Similar to the effect of cessation (except cessation based on 108(1)(e) IRPA), on a final determination under Section 109, to vacate a decision allowing refugee or other protected person status, that will automatically result in the loss (termination) of PR status. (This is section 46(1)(d) IRPA; automatic loss of PR status for cessation is section 46(1)(c.1) IRPA.)
A Quibbling Clarification:
Justice Fuhrer states that "The Respondent successfully brought concurrent applications to cease and to vacate the Applicant’s permanent resident status under subsection 108(2) and section 109" of IRPA.
In terms of the overall, practical effect, yes that the outcome. But in terms of what the actual procedure was, it is almost certain that the Respondent successfully brought concurrent applications to cease and to vacate the Applicant’s refugee status (not PR status) under subsection 108(2) and section 109" of IRPA. The RPD determination of cessation, and vacation respectively, as to refugee status, operate as a matter of law to terminate PR status.
Yeah, I am being very picky. And yeah, much worse is too often seen. I have seen a Federal Court justice refer to a PR's application for a new PR card as an application to renew their "PR visa." Oh well.
The reason for pointing this out, however, is to note and emphasize that even official sources need to be read and understood in context, with consideration given to other sources, and to be careful about giving too much weight to particular words or language.
Which leads to what Justice Fuhrer refers to as "Additional Background." Lots of poor labeling going on. Confusion and conflict over just what RPD decision was properly before the Federal Court. Justice Fuhrer's ruling more or less brushes that aside and proceeds to deal with the substantive merits of both the cessation and vacation determinations. As a practical outcome that makes good sense, largely for the reasons Justice Fuhrer gives.
But it helps if everyone involved, the lawyers, the Minister, the RPD, and especially the Federal Court, keep their act together and properly designate the elements of what is before the court to be decided. (Us legalese nerds have enough to figure out even if they get all their terms and such right.)
Which leads to Ede v. Canada, 2021 FC 804 . . .
Ede v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 804 https://canlii.ca/t/jhbqm
In the Wu decision Justice Fuhrer references this decision by Justice Norris. In turn, Justice Norris quotes the RPD that made the decision being reviewed. One thing that caught my attention was the RPD stating:
That appears to be the RPD's excuse for butchering reason in the analysis of what the evidence proves. Justice Norris dismantles the RPD's reasoning (which is rather bereft of logic) and concludes the RPD's determination that there was misrepresentation (by omission, by withholding material information) was "unreasonable" in that the central finding "lacks justification, intelligibility and transparency" which in turn "renders the decision as a whole unreasonable."
All of which illustrates that these processes are subject to the flaws and foibles of the people who administer the system. This is not to suggest any judgment about the nature and extent of overall problems in the system, any conclusions about whether it does justice or not. In general, my sense is it does justice about as well as can be reasonably, rationally expected. Expecting perfection, even close to perfection, is misguided.
From Justice Fuhrer mischaracterizing the RPD determinations being reviewed, to another Federal Court justice mischaracterizing the application for a PR card as one to renew a PR visa, and from the tangled procedural mess that Justice Fuhrer unraveled, to the RPD just massacring logic in its assessment of evidence in the Ede case, among so many other examples, yes, yes indeed, the system falls far shy of being perfect. But its failures should be approached in context, with due regard for the incredibly complex and difficult cases, both in terms of facts and in terms of issues, and giving due regard to how well things work in the vast majority of the cases, in nearly all but for some bumps and blemishes along the way.
And the latter is why there is a right of appeal for many of the dispositive decisions that can be made affecting status, including in particular PR status. And in addition to the right of appeal, further review is often available if and when there is fair cause for further review. The review procedure is very much about recognizing imperfections exist in the system and there is sometimes flawed decision-making, and providing a means for addressing and remedying these.
Meanwhile, I am not sure how noteworthy or informative it is, but to my eyes (which, confess, see through an experienced litigator's lens, which however largely derives from old not recent history) the nature and scope of the RPD's lack of reason, lack of logic, demands attention. The scope of it is somewhat buried in Justice Norris' detailed analysis. But the gist of it is that the RPD made some rather bizarre (in terms of logic) conclusions.
One was that Ede must have known he was convicted of the crime, a drug trafficking offence more than a decade prior to the conviction (allegedly in 2001), because the court's decision and Interpol flag ("Red Notice") referenced Mr. Ede being present in the court in 2012 when the conviction was entered. The evidence, however, rather demonstrably showed that Mr. Ede was not even in Turkey at the time of the trial and conviction. And there is no explanation for Mr. Ede not being in custody, if he was actually present then and there, given the severity of the crime and lengthy sentence of incarceration imposed. That conclusion was a key factor in the RPD concluding that Mr. Ede was not credible when Mr. Ede denied knowing he had been convicted in 2012 of this crime. And based on that the RPD concluded Mr. Ede must have known there was an outstanding charge against him for the drug offence (back in 2001) when Mr. Ede's made a claim for refugee protection in 2005.
By the way, the RPD concluded that Mr. Ede had not provided "irrefutable proof" he was not present in court at the time of the trial in 2012, imposing an unreasonable burden of proof, particularly in conjunction with the RPD's failure to explain why the RPD in effect dismissed the extensive and strong evidence he was not present at the time of the trial.
Mr. Ede is not home free. Justice Norris ruled that he could still be subject to cessation, just as his wife had been. Even though it appears that it had been more than seven years since Ede visited Turkey (perhaps longer; his wife had in 2014). Illustrating that there is no statute of limitations on when the government can pursue cessation.
This is to offer some follow-up in regards to the Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1071 https://canlii.ca/t/jzgzp decision and the "vacation" of status side of things. As I previously alluded, a lot of the defenses that might save a PR-refugee from cessation will not help much, if at all, in a vacation proceeding based on misrepresentation.
Additionally, there is a reference in the Wu decision to an earlier cessation case I have not referenced in the forum before, so far as I can recall: Ede v. Canada, 2021 FC 804, https://canlii.ca/t/jhbqm which is a decision by Justice Norris. This is now a two year old decision but is worth reviewing for a couple reasons. One reason is that the cessation action itself was, apparently, triggered by just four trips to the home country, at least two of which (and perhaps three) occurred before the change in law, that is, at a time when a PR-refugee's trips to the home country had no legal consequences that would affect PR status.
The other is that like Wu, there is a vacation of status decision involved as well, but in this Ede case that was set aside.
Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1071 https://canlii.ca/t/jzgzp
In particular, in addition to cessation, Guo Ying Wu was determined to have made misrepresentations constituting grounds to vacate the decision allowing her refugee protection under Section 109 IRPA . . . see statute here: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-2.5/page-13.html#h-275723
Similar to the effect of cessation (except cessation based on 108(1)(e) IRPA), on a final determination under Section 109, to vacate a decision allowing refugee or other protected person status, that will automatically result in the loss (termination) of PR status. (This is section 46(1)(d) IRPA; automatic loss of PR status for cessation is section 46(1)(c.1) IRPA.)
A Quibbling Clarification:
Justice Fuhrer states that "The Respondent successfully brought concurrent applications to cease and to vacate the Applicant’s permanent resident status under subsection 108(2) and section 109" of IRPA.
In terms of the overall, practical effect, yes that the outcome. But in terms of what the actual procedure was, it is almost certain that the Respondent successfully brought concurrent applications to cease and to vacate the Applicant’s refugee status (not PR status) under subsection 108(2) and section 109" of IRPA. The RPD determination of cessation, and vacation respectively, as to refugee status, operate as a matter of law to terminate PR status.
Yeah, I am being very picky. And yeah, much worse is too often seen. I have seen a Federal Court justice refer to a PR's application for a new PR card as an application to renew their "PR visa." Oh well.
The reason for pointing this out, however, is to note and emphasize that even official sources need to be read and understood in context, with consideration given to other sources, and to be careful about giving too much weight to particular words or language.
Which leads to what Justice Fuhrer refers to as "Additional Background." Lots of poor labeling going on. Confusion and conflict over just what RPD decision was properly before the Federal Court. Justice Fuhrer's ruling more or less brushes that aside and proceeds to deal with the substantive merits of both the cessation and vacation determinations. As a practical outcome that makes good sense, largely for the reasons Justice Fuhrer gives.
But it helps if everyone involved, the lawyers, the Minister, the RPD, and especially the Federal Court, keep their act together and properly designate the elements of what is before the court to be decided. (Us legalese nerds have enough to figure out even if they get all their terms and such right.)
Which leads to Ede v. Canada, 2021 FC 804 . . .
Note: Ede involves two PR-refugees; one subject to cessation, which was upheld; the other subject to vacation, which was set aside.
Ede v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 804 https://canlii.ca/t/jhbqm
In the Wu decision Justice Fuhrer references this decision by Justice Norris. In turn, Justice Norris quotes the RPD that made the decision being reviewed. One thing that caught my attention was the RPD stating:
". . . we don’t get to do vacation cessation applications very often and therefore we’re not familiar [sic]. I don’t claim to be entirely familiar with the type of evidence that we face."
That appears to be the RPD's excuse for butchering reason in the analysis of what the evidence proves. Justice Norris dismantles the RPD's reasoning (which is rather bereft of logic) and concludes the RPD's determination that there was misrepresentation (by omission, by withholding material information) was "unreasonable" in that the central finding "lacks justification, intelligibility and transparency" which in turn "renders the decision as a whole unreasonable."
All of which illustrates that these processes are subject to the flaws and foibles of the people who administer the system. This is not to suggest any judgment about the nature and extent of overall problems in the system, any conclusions about whether it does justice or not. In general, my sense is it does justice about as well as can be reasonably, rationally expected. Expecting perfection, even close to perfection, is misguided.
From Justice Fuhrer mischaracterizing the RPD determinations being reviewed, to another Federal Court justice mischaracterizing the application for a PR card as one to renew a PR visa, and from the tangled procedural mess that Justice Fuhrer unraveled, to the RPD just massacring logic in its assessment of evidence in the Ede case, among so many other examples, yes, yes indeed, the system falls far shy of being perfect. But its failures should be approached in context, with due regard for the incredibly complex and difficult cases, both in terms of facts and in terms of issues, and giving due regard to how well things work in the vast majority of the cases, in nearly all but for some bumps and blemishes along the way.
And the latter is why there is a right of appeal for many of the dispositive decisions that can be made affecting status, including in particular PR status. And in addition to the right of appeal, further review is often available if and when there is fair cause for further review. The review procedure is very much about recognizing imperfections exist in the system and there is sometimes flawed decision-making, and providing a means for addressing and remedying these.
Meanwhile, I am not sure how noteworthy or informative it is, but to my eyes (which, confess, see through an experienced litigator's lens, which however largely derives from old not recent history) the nature and scope of the RPD's lack of reason, lack of logic, demands attention. The scope of it is somewhat buried in Justice Norris' detailed analysis. But the gist of it is that the RPD made some rather bizarre (in terms of logic) conclusions.
One was that Ede must have known he was convicted of the crime, a drug trafficking offence more than a decade prior to the conviction (allegedly in 2001), because the court's decision and Interpol flag ("Red Notice") referenced Mr. Ede being present in the court in 2012 when the conviction was entered. The evidence, however, rather demonstrably showed that Mr. Ede was not even in Turkey at the time of the trial and conviction. And there is no explanation for Mr. Ede not being in custody, if he was actually present then and there, given the severity of the crime and lengthy sentence of incarceration imposed. That conclusion was a key factor in the RPD concluding that Mr. Ede was not credible when Mr. Ede denied knowing he had been convicted in 2012 of this crime. And based on that the RPD concluded Mr. Ede must have known there was an outstanding charge against him for the drug offence (back in 2001) when Mr. Ede's made a claim for refugee protection in 2005.
By the way, the RPD concluded that Mr. Ede had not provided "irrefutable proof" he was not present in court at the time of the trial in 2012, imposing an unreasonable burden of proof, particularly in conjunction with the RPD's failure to explain why the RPD in effect dismissed the extensive and strong evidence he was not present at the time of the trial.
Mr. Ede is not home free. Justice Norris ruled that he could still be subject to cessation, just as his wife had been. Even though it appears that it had been more than seven years since Ede visited Turkey (perhaps longer; his wife had in 2014). Illustrating that there is no statute of limitations on when the government can pursue cessation.
New cessation case on Canlii: https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2023/2023fc1194/2023fc1194.html
The significance of most new cases, now, is largely nuance. Even though on its face this case is a *win* for Mr. Fazl Minalloh Muhammad Anvar, the cessation of status decision set aside, it is not likely that he is home free. In this decision, Anvar v. Canada, 2023 FC 1194, https://canlii.ca/t/jzzj6 , Justice Avvy Yao-Yao Go allows the application for judicial review and returns the case to be redetermined by a differently constituted panel of the RPD, which is the standard outcome when the applicant in effect wins the appeal. But the majority of the decision documents why the RPD's decisions were reasonable with just one exception, the exception for which the appeal was granted. And as to that one exception, regarding the state of the PR/refugee's knowledge that returning to the home country could put their refugee status in jeopardy, Justice Go does not even suggest the evidence favours the PR/refugee and states that the RPD's failure to consider the PR/refugee's subjective knowledge "did not rise to a reviewable error," but, rather, given the seriousness of the consequences, Justice Go decided the "appropriate" outcome was to send the matter back for redetermination, a redetermination in which the evidence as to the PR/refugee's subjective knowledge or awareness, could be included in the RPD's decision-making.
I do not know how it will go, but I suspect the risk of a negative outcome remains substantial if not probable.
The most recent date this refugee returned to the home country, as alleged in the cessation case, was 2015. It is hard to say how long cessation proceedings had been pending, but at minimum this signals CBSA/IRCC are still proceeding with cessation based on conduct many years ago.
Thanks for the detailed reply. This Camayo case happened very recently (fall 2022) so the majority of the cases are now getting Judicial Review Granted based on the Camayo case. Do you think this is getting better now? There is one article that I found: https://cila.co/refugee-cessation-the-year-since-galindo-camayo/
The article you reference and link is a good summary, and provides an illuminating explanation of key elements in regards to cessation; obviously better written than my clumsy efforts. The link is appreciated.
The article is a little dated, however, given extensive treatment of the Camayo decision in numerous subsequent cases, and the article is focused on cessation proceedings. To my view it is really, really important to repeat and emphasize the message that PR-refugees should NOT obtain a home country passport, NOT use a home country passport if they have obtained one, NOT use it again if they already have, AND FOR SURE, do NOT travel to the home country, and if they already have, do NOT travel to home country again.
Clarification: the key Camayo decision, by the Federal Court of Appeals, was issued in March 2022, more than a year and a half ago. I began my coverage and analysis of this decision here, in this forum, April 6, 2022, post #599 in this thread in particular:
. . . and overall have addressed, in nearly a dozen posts in this thread alone since then, the impact of Camayo, as reflected in numerous other decisions addressing and applying the prescription dictated by the Federal Court of Appeal. Warrants noting that there are several dozen FC decisions which cite the Camayo FCA decision. Most of the decisions @scylla and I reference, above, in posts over the course of the last year, deal with Camayo to some extent. In my posts #741, 742, back in May, I go into a fairly deep dive regarding how Camayo has been applied . . . focused on distinguishing the consideration of criteria as prescribed by Camayo in contrast to the negative (cessation) outcomes nonetheless; in particular I discuss several cases in which Camayo factors played a significant role but still, in most the RPD's cessation decision is upheld.
"Do you think this is getting better now?"
In general, it does not appear that the Camayo decision is helping all that many PR-refugees save their status when they become subject to cessation proceedings based on reavailment for having obtained a passport from their home country, and traveling there. It may have some influence in the CBSA/IRCC decision-making as to whether to prosecute cessation, and may be facilitating SOME successful defenses before the IRB, but that's information we just don't have. We are almost clueless in regards to who, when, and why some who travel to the home country are spared cessation proceedings and others are not, other than the obvious, the obvious being that multiple trips to the home country, and/or lengthy stays in the home country, clearly increase the risk of cessation proceedings and loss of status.
There is NO doubt that for now, and for the foreseeable future, as already noted, PR-refugees should NOT obtain a home country passport, NOT use a home country passport if they have obtained one, NOT use it again if they already have, AND FOR SURE, do NOT travel to the home country . . . allowing, again, if they have already traveled to the home country, do NOT do that again . . . not unless and not until Canadian citizenship is obtained. Camayo has not diminished the importance of this.
Beyond that, in terms of whether things are "better," I generally steer clear of value judgments. I have made something of an exception in regards to cessation but that was in large part rooted in how the change in law (2012) was implemented and applied, used to strip PRs of their Canadian status based on conduct which, at the time they did it, had no legal impact on their status as Canadians. Even though the courts ruled to the contrary, this change had a severe retroactive effect, in effect punishing Canadians (remember, PRs are Canadians under the Canadian immigration system, not Foreign Nationals) for actions taken prior to the adoption of law. That is, before December 2012 a PR-refugee could travel to their home country and that would have NO impact on their status. After December 2012, not only would PR-refugees face potential cessation if they traveled to their home country, they could be subject to cessation, and a large number were, for having traveled to the home country YEARS before 2012. That's the sort of ex post facto law that is, on its face, blatantly unjust and draconian.
It was as if they lowered the speed limit on a roadway and then issued tickets for going faster than that before they changed the speed limit . . . except the consequences for cessation are far, far more severe, for some potentially life-threatening.
But given the passage of time in the meantime, that is less an issue. There appear to still be a few backlogged cases involving cessation based on conduct before 2012, before the change in law, but most (by a lot) involve cessation based on acts taking place since the change in law. PR-refugees should now be aware that cessation for reavailment can apply to them and it would be prudent to act accordingly. Which leads to the other objectionable aspect of this . . .
The other objectionable, and outright offensive aspect of the change in law regarding cessation, was rooted in the fact that the consequences for obtaining and using a home country passport, or traveling to the home country, were often NOT explained to PR-refugees. Some were actually given their passports back. Until around 2015 or so, call centre agents were advising PR-refugees that yes, they needed a home country passport when making an application for citizenship. The article you link talks a little about this and suggests that new refugees are still (well, as of a year or so ago) not being clearly advised about reavailment and cessation.
Hopefully the word is out now and PR-refugees are getting a clear message, which is worth repeating at least one more time:
PR-refugees should NOT obtain a home country passport, NOT use a home country passport if they have obtained one, NOT use it again if they already have, AND FOR SURE, do NOT travel to the home country, and if they already have, do NOT travel to home country again.
Thanks for this analysis. I was wondering / thinking the same thing - i.e. whether the ultimate outcome will still be negative.
Thanks for the detailed answer. Do you by any chance have any kind of cases where they were allowed to keep their Refugee Status after cessation case? I mean in what ways does it make a little bit more compelling? One of my friend visited back home to get married and visit his wife's grandmother (stayed for 1 month, for once only) and then came back to Canada. After a year, he got this cessation application. (He only went back once for wedding and to visit his wife's grandmother who later died). Do you think this is a bit of a rare case as I have never seen any case online where the applicant got a cessation application on only 1 visit. All of the cases are mostly 2+ times and for a much longer stay.