The following is mostly restating what has been been posted here before, and indeed stated here multiple times.
But these cases are worth noting and highlighting, as a reminder at the least. One of the arguments that Karasu made, in this latest case, is that he "
did not understand the consequences . . . (re cessation)" No surprise, spoiler alert, this defense, this argument, does not fly well, if at all.
For reference that is the decision and written opinion by Justice Martine St-Louis in the Federal Court for the Karasu v. Canada, 2023 FC 654
https://canlii.ca/t/jx63x case.
For purposes of this forum, these cases are now mostly continuing affirmation of what has been definitively decided repeatedly before:
-- the government is in fact proceeding with cessation cases against PR-refugees, and
-- individuals with refugee status should:
-- -- avoid obtaining a home country passport
-- -- avoid using a home country passport
-- -- avoid travel to the home country
It is a little more complicated for those who already have done any of these. That gets into the risks, the probabilities, of CBSA and the RPD pursuing cessation. The main fulcrum in risk is whether or not the PR-refugee has traveled to the home country; low risk if not, significant to high risk if so, but for sure a high risk for those who have traveled to the home country either frequently or for any extended stay.
Thus,
for those who have traveled to the home country, the odds range widely. Again, the more or the longer, the bigger the risk of cessation. Best I can offer is
(1) STOP using the passport and absolutely
NO MORE travel to the home country, and
(2) consult with a lawyer BEFORE applying for citizenship, or at the least wait long enough to apply that any travel using the passport, and for sure any travel to the home country, was more than FIVE years previous (thus outside the "
eligibility period," outside the time frame for reporting travel history); noting, however, doing the latter does NOT guarantee avoiding cessation.
For those who have not traveled to the home country, it appears the risk is low enough there is little cause to worry. Main thing is to NOT use the passport again and not travel to the home country.
In regards to the latter, there appears to still be some observers and commentators who suggest (some more adamantly arguing) that there is so little risk as long as the PR does not travel to the home country, that it is OK to obtain a passport and even use it for some international travel (such as obtaining home country passport and using it to travel to a vacation destination) . . . as long as they do not travel to the home country. And, indeed, so far all of the cases seen prosecuted, resulting in cessation, have involved at least one trip to the home country.
BUT there should be no mistake, no mincing words, in this case (Karasu), much like almost all the cases reaching the Federal Court, the FC judge reiterates
the presumption of reavailment just by renewing the home country passport (or, in many of the other cases, otherwise obtaining passport).
In particular, like most of the cessation decisions, Justice Martine St-Louis states:
[42] In regards to intent, the fact that a refugee applies for and obtains a passport from his or her country of nationality, creates a presumption that the individual intends to reavail themself of the diplomatic protection of that country.
Justice St-Louis adds:
This presumption is particularly strong where the individual actually uses the passport to travel to his or her country of nationality.
But Justice St-Louis also adds, referencing oft quoted prior decisions:
. . . the Minister is entitled to rely on the presumption of re-availment by proving that the refugee obtained or renewed a passport from his or her country of origin. Once that has been proved, the refugee has the burden of showing that that he or she did not actually seek re-availment. As stated in the UNHCR Handbook, where there is proof that a refugee has obtained or renewed a passport “t will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed that he intends to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality.”
Conclusion: Again, the decision in Karasu v. Canada, 2023 FC 654
https://canlii.ca/t/jx63x does not offer much, if anything, new. But it illustrates and reaffirms what we know, and is a reminder. PR-refugees should NOT obtain (or renew) home country passport, NOT use a home country passport, and ABSOLUTELY NOT travel to the home country.
REMINDER --What Is At Stake:
It is worth repeating what is at stake:
Canadians with PR status who obtained such status as a refugee or protected person are subject to cessation of status on various grounds, with "reavailment" of home country protection looming as the most common, typically triggered by travel to the home country, BUT just renewing or obtaining a home country passport establishes a PRESUMPTION of reavailment.
If subject to cessation of refugee status, this has very severe consequences:[/I]
-- PR status is automatically terminated
-- there is no right of appeal
-- the former PR-refugee is barred from making a H&C application for PR
-- the former PR-refugee is barred from seeking Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
-- the former PR-refugee is inadmissible, subject to removal from Canada "as soon as possible," and barred from returning to Canada for at least a year (and in practical terms, for far, far longer, given the difficulty the former PR-refugee will have obtaining status to come to Canada)
That is, cessation has far more immediate and severe consequences than those imposed on PRs who lose PR status because they have been convicted of very serious crimes. That's part of why so many find cessation, as applied to Canadians (those with PR status), to be exceedingly harsh.
Some More Technical Aspects:
(FWIW)
Intention versus Voluntariness:
Karasu raises an argument based on distinguishing what constitutes "
voluntary" reavailment verus "
intentional" reavailment. These are separate elements.
Reminder: the Federal Court of Appeals decision that now governs these cessation cases, the oft cited (and in posts above discussed) Camayo decision, frames cessation on the grounds of reavailment as depending on three elements:
-- Voluntariness of the PR-refugee's actions
-- Intention to reavail themselves of home country protection
-- actually obtaining state protection
I will not attempt to unravel Karasu's argument, or Justice St-Louis response, other than to reiterate and emphasize there is a presumption of intentional reavailment based on just obtaining a passport. See quotes above. In many contexts "
intent" is difficult to prove, especially in regards to indirect consequences. There are many reasons why someone will travel to their home country (like Karasu, to find a wife or husband seems to be quite common; visit ailing parents is another), with no thought let alone specific intent to reavail themselves of home country protection by doing that. But because of the presumption, it is the PR-refugee's burden to prove there was NO intent to reavail home country protection. As difficult as proving intent can sometimes be, proving a negative is . . . well, the farm boy perspective looms again:
a tough row to hoe.
More 108(1)(e) Arguments:
Karasu also argues that the RPD should have at least explained why it proceeded to find cessation based on reavailment (section 108(1)(a) IRPA), rather than based on the need for protection no longer existing (section 108(1)(e) IRPA). If cessation of status is determined based on the latter, that does not affect a PR-refugee's status in Canada. Cessation based on a determination it is safe to return to the home country does NOT cause the PR-refugee to lose PR status.
There have been several versions of this argument in other cases. So far NONE have worked.
PR-refugees should recognize that even if things have changed in the home country, making it safe to travel there, to actually travel there risks cessation proceedings on the grounds of reavailment and all the severely negative consequences that follow.