PART II of the Long Explanation for why the Halepota decision does not offer a separate, subsection 5(4) path to citizenship, for PRs employed abroad by International Organizations.
Availability of Grant of Canadian citizenship based on subsection 5(4) in the Citizenship Act:
As noted, subsection 5(4) in the Citizenship Act provides a legal ground for the Minister to "
grant citizenship to any person to alleviate cases of statelessness or of special and unusual hardship or to reward services of an exceptional value to Canada."
So, as noted in the previous post, one might ask the question:
Does the Halepota case signal a separate, subsection 5(4) path to citizenship, for PRs employed abroad by International Organizations?
While technically it is an "opinion," and despite my usual effort to clearly separate opinion from objective information, I can confidently state, without reservation, the answer to this question is NO. Emphatically, no (
. . . with very RARE exceptions). While this is an "informed" opinion, based on some careful research, I am no expert. So I do not expect anyone to rely, so-to-say, on my say-so. This long explanation is an effort to
show-the-work.
The "
special cases" provision, subsection 5(4) in the Citizenship Act, is rarely applied at all, and even when applied that tends to be more about alleviating special cases of statelessness or of special and unusual hardship. It is uncommon even in such cases, and narrowly applied, exceptionally so. Also note, for example, the one and only case (an unreported decision) Justice Grammond cites as coming close to supporting his Halepota decision (as to a grant of citizenship as a reward for service), was actually decided on the basis of hardship, not a reward for services of exceptional value to Canada.
At a glance one might wonder why Justice Grammond did not cite the M.H. (Re), 1996 CanLII 11920 (FC),
https://canlii.ca/t/4g95 case, which is perhaps the only other case that comes close to supporting Justice Grammond's
reward-for-valuable-service decision in Halepota . . . a case in which the applicant applied for Canadian citizenship just 8 months after becoming a landed immigrant, not anywhere near close to meeting the then applicable residency requirement. But it was clearly an application based on 5(4) and focused on the applicant deserving reward for having performed services of an exceptional value to Canada. In that case Justice Mckeown stated:
The appellant has satisfied me that this is a case where he has performed services of an exceptional value to Canada within the meaning of subsection 5(4) as well as being a case of special and unusual hardship and I therefore recommend that the discretion of the Governor in Council under that subsection be exercised so as to direct the Minister to grant Canadian citizenship to the appellant. (Note, procedure now would be different due to subsequent changes in the law.)
Nonetheless, demanding emphasis and to be clear, over the course of the last FOUR DECADES there are very few, very, very few examples, in which a "
reward [for]
services of an exceptional value to Canada" has been the basis for an actual grant of citizenship.
Representative examples:
-- An American ice dancer, Piper Gilles, back in 2013, granted citizenship in time for her to compete on behalf of Canada in the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi.
-- An especially skilled Chinese-born table tennis player, Eugene Zhen Wang, in 2012, so he could compete on behalf of Canada at the summer games in London.
-- Levente Mady, a top-ranked Romanian swimmer, back in the late 1970s, who went on to compete in the 1984 summer games on behalf of Canada.
That said, Halepota is not the only Federal Court decision supporting the application of 5(4) to grant citizenship to, at least in significant part, "
reward services of an exceptional value to Canada." I mentioned the M.H. case (from a quarter century ago). I mentioned Levente Mady (more than four decades ago). And there are a few others, very, very few others. If one includes decisions based on hardship, there was the Mitha decision (also more than FOUR decades ago) cited by Justice Grammond.
So, IF (and it is a rather prominent, contingent "if"), IF Halepota was eventually granted citizenship, and assuming that Justice Grammond's rationale is reasonably sound (it is NOT, but setting that aside for the moment) and worth advancing on behalf of another person with a prominent career with the United Nations, or some other comparable entity engaged in noble and important humanitarian work, there is no suggestion this has led to a grant of citizenship for more than a handful or so of individuals . . . over a period of FOUR DECADES . . . among six million or more applications for citizenship. Those are lottery odds, at best.
In contrast, in one of the most cited grant citizenship Federal Court decisions, Koo (Re), 1992 CanLII 2417 (FC), [1993] 1 FC 286,
https://canlii.ca/t/4gqw , Justice Reed stated "
The decision whether to make a recommendation under subsection 5(4) is so highly discretionary that the failure to make one should not be the subject of an appeal." Since, as I noted, FC decisions do not establish binding precedent, other FC Justices have nonetheless entertained 5(4) in the appeal, including Justice Grammond in Halepota, and Justice Mckeown in the M.H. case. To put things in perspective, however, Justice Reed's decision in Koo has been cited as influential in
hundreds other cases, more than a few of which cite it specifically in support of denying relief on the basis of 5(4), whereas Halepota has never been cited by another judge in any formal, published decisions, and M.H. has been cited in just two Federal Court decisions, both with an outcome in the opposite direction (that would be Chen v. Canada, 2012 FC 874
https://canlii.ca/t/fs3f0 and Fan v. Canada, 2002 FCT 746
https://canlii.ca/t/k61 ).
I do not intend to revisit an extensive list of those cases in which the Federal Court has allowed 5(4) to be "
the subject of an appeal," and thus to that extent contrary to the decision in Koo, but even among those that do, they nonetheless overwhelmingly reach a conclusion contrary to the outcome in Halepota and the M.H. case. For a sample of how, almost casually, the Federal Courts have typically addressed but then brushed off 5(4) arguments, in addition to Chen and Fan, cited above, see
None of those cases, which are but a small sample, and few of the many others similarly brushing off 5(4) claims, involve applicants who have a history of service to humanitarian or Canadian interests anywhere near approaching that of Bushra Halepota. Which in significant part is kind of the point. Illustrating the extent to which the Halepota decision is essentially a one-off, based on her special case. Not many bring to the table
DECADES of "
commendable" dedication to work in providing services of exceptional value, in a lengthy career devoted to humanitarian interests.
But even for applicants with backgrounds which, as this or that jurist has described it, warrant consideration as to "
whether it would be appropriate to grant citizenship to the appellant as a reward for services of an exceptional value to Canada," the appeal is typically denied . . . even where the case for an exercise of discretion is strong enough for the judge to make an informal recommendation to the Minister, such as in the Lee (Re), 1997 CanLII 16799 (FC),
https://canlii.ca/t/4f6w decision (following and applying Koo).
All of the above is intended to illustrate and demonstrate that even if the Halepota decision offers, as some might think, an "argument" supporting a grant of citizenship for someone who does not otherwise meet the requirements under 5(1), based on service with a humanitarian organization, it is an argument lacking any measurable prospect of success except, perhaps, in the most unusual, special circumstances. Even years of employment for an International Organization is highly unlikely to come close.
That said, as I have occasionally alluded above, the Halepota decision itself is deeply flawed, essentially rendering it of little or no accord (except as to Halepota personally), undermining whatever analogous or precedential value it might have had otherwise. This too is "opinion," and subject to the caveat that the outcome of a case is sometimes referenced as supporting an argument for a similar outcome even when the reasoning underlying the cited, previous outcome, is flawed. But recognizing that not all opinions are created equal, and that in particular it is worth considering the reasoning underlying some opinions, I will address the scope, substance, and merits of Justice Grammond's Halepota decision in the following post.