Attention all AEO aspirants!
Why Arranged Employment Opinion may be eliminated – Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Program
All AEO aspirants please go through the following . Interesting read.
logo
Pacific Canada Immigration Services>Home > News > Why Arranged Employment Opinion may be eliminated – Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Program
Print
Why Arranged Employment Opinion may be eliminated – Evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Program
February 18, 2012
From the CIC Evaluation Division – report obtained under Access to Information Highlights:
“IRPA FSWs [Foreign Skilled Workers] earn significantly more than their pre-IRPA counterparts.”
“IRPA cases make about $10,000 to $17,000 more than pre-IRPA FSWs admitted during the same period, depending on the cohort and tax year considered.” “The incidence of employment insurance and social assistance benefits is also lower for IRPA FSWs than for pre-IRPA FSWs.”
“The effectiveness of selection criteria: “Once having controlled for province of residence, origin and intended occupation skill type, regression analysis shows that the most relevant factors for economic success of immigrants are, by order of importance, arranged employment, language and work in Canada prior to migration. Among other factors from the selection grid, age, education, work experience and partner’s education also have a positive effect on employment earnings, while having received points for relatives in Canada affects earnings of FSWs negatively.”
Details:
(i) Arranged Employment Offer: “Having an AEO is the factor from the selection grid that affects the earnings of FSWs the most. One year after landing, IRPA FSWs who had an AEO were earning 74% more than those who did not have one.”
“IMDB data shows that the average employment earnings for FSWs with an AEO were $79,200 three years after landing, compared to $44,200 for those without.”
“Employers can make a permanent employment offer to a foreign national in a skilled occupation and then request an Arranged Employment Opinion from HRSDC. The wages and working conditions offered for the job have to be comparable to those offered to Canadians working in the occupation. However, there is no requirement to demonstrate that there are no Canadians available to fill the position. Under IRPA, HRSDC is mandated to assess offers of employment made by employers interested in hiring a skilled worker.”
“Initial processing and assessment of arranged employment offers is administered through an HRSDC Centre of Specialization located in Saint John, New Brunswick. HRSDC officers provide an opinion regarding an offer of employment on an indeterminate basis to a prospective skilled worker. In forming the opinion, the officers assess whether:
The offer of employment is genuine; The employment represents full-time, non-seasonal employment; and The wages offered to the skilled worker are consistent with the prevailing wage rate for the occupation and the working conditions meet generally accepted Canadian standards.
“In reviewing the genuineness of the job offer, HRSDC officers examine the consistency of the predominant duties defined for the position with the duties outlined in the NOC, whether mandatory licensing/certifications are identified, and whether the employment offer is consistent with the needs of the company given its business activities, size and operations. In addition, HRSDC offices assess employer-related factors such as business location, the active engagement of the employer in business activities, whether at least one full-time employee has been working for the employer for a minimum of one year, and whether it is reasonable to expect that the employer will fulfill the terms of employment (e.g. the company’s ability to indeterminately support the salary offered to skilled workers). If HRSDC officers provide a positive opinion on the offer of employment, it is forwarded to CIC visa offices where the applicant is assessed against the selection criteria…” “The AEO, if accepted by the visa officer, entitles the applicant to an additional 15 points towards the threshold of 67 points.”
“Officers in the visa offices visited were overwhelmingly negative about the AEO. They believe that it is fraught with fraud, difficult to validate the employers and job offers from overseas, inefficient to process, and that it provides an avenue for applicants who cannot receive sufficient points on the key human capital criteria, to be approved as permanent residents. It was noted that it is contrary to the human capital model. Suggestions for improvement ranged from cleaning up the program, to lowering the allocated points, to completely eliminating AEOs.”
“In the interviews, CVOA staff (particularly those from Hong Kong and New Delhi) indicated that applicants often use AEOs to compensate for not receiving sufficient points under the language or education criteria (or more recently, as a means to by-pass Ministerial Instructions and the list of 38 occupations; the percentage of
FSWs with AEOs has increased significantly since the introduction of Ministerial Instructions in 2008).”
“The Hong Kong office has seen a significant increase in AEO applications, most notably in the last few years, and a significant drop in approval rates (from over 90% at the time of IRPA implementation to just over 40% in 2007, and to only 24% in 2008 likely due to the introduction of Ministerial Instructions). In the view of the visa office staff, this trend might have been, at least in part, the result of applicants abusing AEO in the desire to compensate for lower scores on other criteria (e.g. English language skills) or to get a priority assessment.”
“AEOs tend to be perceived very negatively by all levels of staff across the large visa offices visited. In interviews and focus groups, staff and managers expressed concern and frustration over the due diligence required to assess the validity of the job offers and the legitimacy of the employers.” “Some CVOA [Canadian Visa offices Abroad] staff expressed serious concerns over the level of fraud involved, and the due diligence required to assess the validity of job offers. The AEO fraud is commonly associated with job offers from non-existent employers, fictitious positions incompatible with the type of business or business operations, offers of convenience from friends or family members, and genuine offers with inflated job descriptions.”
“There is also a concern in CVOAs that AEOs can be purchased and that clients are being lured to pay large fees to consultants for job offers that they believe await them in Canada.”
“Fraud is generally hard to prove, and AEO fraud-related refusals cannot be extracted from the administrative systems. Some visa offices are conducting independent investigations in an effort to demonstrate the lack of integrity and level of fraud associated with AEOs.”
“The missions employ different strategies to verify the job offer. For example, the Hong Kong office typically requests a number of documents from employers such as tax return assessments, banking information, financial statement information, etc. Other strategies used include calling employers in Canada and asking them specific questions about the job duties, or conducting further investigation by checking their business registration and company website. The case studies showed that the quality of applications with AEOs varies across the missions. For example, the Buffalo office reports that most AEOs are approved and points awarded (about 90%), while the New Delhi office estimated an acceptance rate of about 30%. New Delhi officers have been compiling information on small businesses that have made multiple job offers.”
“Visa officers note that it may take longer to process a refusal than an acceptance, and this is particularly problematic with AEOs. Additional steps can be taken to investigate suspected fraud and, as noted above, additional documentation may be requested. Concerns often center on the authenticity of the job offer; follow-up with employers in Canada is hindered by time differences. If the visa officer intends to refuse the AEO, he/she must send a letter of concern to the applicant stating the concerns, and provide the applicant with the opportunity to respond. Processing AEOs is generally viewed as highly inefficient and time consuming, with insufficient support within Canada to address fraud in the process.”
“The gap in earnings between those who had an AEO and those who did not diminishes over time. For every year spent in the country, the gap in earnings diminishes by 9%.”
“Visa officers across the 5 missions do not support assigning an additional 5 points for AEOs for the reasons noted above.”
(ii) Language: “The second most important influence on employment earnings is language. The effect of language points on earnings increases gradually with the more points earned, and reaches a peak between 16 to 20 points, which corresponds to having received the maximum points for the knowledge of the first official language. Individuals scoring in that range of points have earnings that are 38% to 39% higher than FSWs who received between 0 to 7 points for language.”
(iii) Adaptability: “Immigrants who worked in Canada for at least one year prior to applying as an FSW earned 27% more that those who did not have Canadian work experience prior to migration. In addition, those who received the maximum number of points (5) for their partner’s education under the adaptability factor also have significantly higher employment earnings (12%). However, for those who did not receive the maximum number of points (who received 3 or 4 points), the difference in earnings was not statistically significant, meaning that they do not earn significantly more than those who did nor receive any points for their partner’s education.”
(iv) Age: “‘Age at landing’ is a significant predictor of employment earnings. Results show that immigrants arriving at a younger age earn more than those who arrive in Canada at a later age. Immigrants who were less than 30 years old at landing earned 27% more than people 50 years of age or older, while the gap in earnings was 14% higher for those who were between 45 and 49 years old when they landed, when compared to the older age group.”
“Most visa officers interviewed recommended that the upper limit of the age for which maximum points are awarded be reduced. Proposed ages for maximum points ranged from 35 to 45. Concern was also expressed that some older FSWs are applying to retire in Canada. Interviewees also believe that placing a focus on younger skilled workers would enable the [Immigration] Program to better offset some of the impacts of the aging population (although demographic research suggests a very minimal impact at best).”
(v) Education: “Points received for education also have an impact on employment earnings. Those who received 25 points (having either a Master’s degree or a Ph.D) were found to earn 17% more than immigrants who received between 0 and 15 points, and 14% more for those who received 20 points (two year diploma, trade certificate, apprenticeship or two year university diploma). However, immigrants who received 22 points (three year diploma, trade certificate, apprenticeship or two or more university degree at the bachelor’s level) have an advantage of only 9% with regards to employment earnings compared to those obtained by FSWs in the reference category (0 to 15 points).”
“When allocating education points, visa offices do not have the tools to distinguish between the highest ranked universities in the world and small, local and unregulated schools. Degrees from these two extremes are allocated the same points. Many visa officers argued that it is essential to create equivalencies in education to equitably apply this criterion and to ensure that the FSWP is selecting qualified applicants. London was the one visa office visited that establishes equivalencies, through using the British NARIC system which provides benchmarks for educational equivalencies. Long-distance education is becoming more common and posing challenges for the visa officers. The case studies indicate that it isn’t being assessed in a consistent manner across the delivery network.”
(vi) Work experience: “PAs [Principal Applicants] who received the maximum number of points for experience (4 years or more of experience) earned 14% more than immigrants who received points for only one year of work experience prior to migration. There is no significant difference in earnings between those who received points for two or three years of experience when compared to those who had one year of experience.”
“Some interviewees suggested points be assigned for work experience in Canada or in similar countries and several noted that Canada should require credential recognition to be established prior to immigration. A primary concern in assigning points for experience is the level of fraud and the difficulty in establishing the validity of the experience, particularly in countries where the economic structures are diverse, with numerous small family- owned businesses.”
(vii) Spouse’s education: “Concerns around points for spousal education related to the equivalency issue and the observation that many spouses had never worked in their field.”
THE NEGATIVE FACTORS: “Two factors in the selection grid have a negative impact on earnings. The first one relates to having relatives in Canada, which is associated with 8% lower earnings.” “There was widespread concern that a relative in Canada was not related to successful integration. Staff noted that often the relative was geographically distant from the intended destination of the applicant and that the relative is often not immediate family.” “Having studied in Canada for at least two years prior to migration is also associated with lower earnings (-6%). This could be attributable to their possibly limited work experience or to the fact that some of them may still be pursuing their studies. In addition, the models control for language abilities, which may be one of the benefits of having studied in Canada.”
POSSIBILITY: “Staff in the missions suggested that working and studying in a country other than one’s ‘country of nationality’ could be an alternative indicator of ability to adapt.”
CONCLUSION: “To improve the FSWP, interviewees, CVOA staff, and research on other similar programs, suggest that consideration should also be given to:
Requiring formal language testing and placing greater emphasis on full fluency in one of the official languages;
Placing a higher priority on younger skilled workers; Establishing educational equivalencies and requiring credential recognition in regulated professions;
Reviewing the adaptability criterion particularly with respect to awarding AEO points under two different criteria; spousal education; and the definition of relatives in Canada.”
* Reproduced with permission from Richard Kurland (LEXBASE 2012, VOLUME 23, ISSUE 2)
Back to News
Tweet
Privacy Policy
Disclaimer
Home
Online Assessment
Contacts
Copyright © 2011, Pacific Canada Immigration Services. All rights reserved.
img
Pacific Canada Immigration Services
Property of:
