links18 said:
So is the legal issue here more one of legal standing or has Galati's challenge been rejected on substantive grounds?
Actually Justice Rennie ruled that Galati and Azevedo had standing, what the court describes as "public interest standing."
The decision to dismiss is based on two grounds:
-- the matter is not justiciable
-- the named defendants are not proper parties, not subject to the suit brought
Notwithstanding his ruling that there was no cause upon which the court could rule (there being no justiciable issue in the case), Justice Rennie nonetheless also proceeded to issue a ruling on the substantive merits of the challenge itself.
Frankly I don't think this was properly before the court, since what was before the court was a motion to dismiss on specific narrow grounds. And Justice Rennie makes multiple allusions to there being no need for any further evidence, argument, reference to legal authority, as to justify his decision to go ahead and decide a matter he rules the court cannot properly decide.
Despite the sweeping language of the decision, I have serious doubts that its proclamations regarding the nature of nationality and citizenship constitute law. Justice Rennie may be right, but I don't think this decision amounts to a statement of law on the subject, but is rather more or less his editorializing.
bambino said:
I was looking for a brand new decision, not for one from a week or two ago.
The decision is dated January 22 but it was just published by the Federal Court late yesterday (along with more than a dozen other cases involving CIC decided in the month of January). It is about as new as decisions get.
bambino said:
It's a good that the judge went to such great lengths to address the substantive issues raised by the application. Often judges will do that, saying basically: I rule thus on issue A, so issue B is moot; however if I am wrong about issue A, here is what I think re: issue B. That way if it goes to appeal, the higher court can rule on both issues.
One question I have is about the extent to which the substantive merits were briefed and argued, since my understanding of the motion and hearing which took place were focused on the issues of standing, proper parties, and justiciability, with the underlying substantive cause only being addressed to the extent it overcomes the threshold of not being so unlikely to succeed that its outcome is a "foregone conclusion."
It is one thing to say that this or that issue decides a matter, which if overturned on appeal leaves open other questions. There are principles of judicial economy which favour this approach. A typical example is a suit for damages arising from a tort. If the court rules a tort was not committed, that renders the issue of damages moot. But the court may nonetheless rule on damages as well.
In that case the court has authority to rule on the other issues, like damages, even if ultimately the damages issue is moot given the lack of liability based on there having been no tort proven.
On the other hand, if the argument is that the court lacks jurisdiction, it would be at the least incongruous for a court to rule against its having jurisdiction and proceeding to nonetheless hear and decide the issues otherwise.
In this case Justice Rennie ruled that the matter was
not justiciable, not a matter properly before the court, that is, not a matter regarding which he has any authority to judge. That is not merely an element in a claim which makes other issues moot . . . it is a ruling which, if followed,
precludes Justice Rennie from ruling on the matter. He rules on the matter, on the substantive issues, anyway.
Oddly enough, Justice Rennie rules the matter is not justiciable, but along the way makes statements like this: ". . . .this proceeding is a reasonable and effective means of bringing to court the question of the legislative competence of Parliament in respect of citizenship. . . . [and this proceeding is an] effective vehicle for determining the narrow question raised in this application.
One is tempted to ask Justice Rennie which is it, is the matter not a proper one for the court to hear and decide, or as he states in paragraph 27, is it a reasonable and effective means of bringing to court the question of the legislative competence of Parliament in respect of citizenship?