Observations:
A key element, perhaps the key element, at stake in this challenge, is that Bill C-24 implemented grounds for revoking citizenship based not on the validity of the individual's citizenship, but based on the conduct of a citizen while a citizen.
In other words, grounds for revoking citizenship now include acts committed while a citizen. This is a major conceptual change. Previously citizenship could only be taken away if there was, overtly or in effect, renunciation of citizenship, or if the grant of citizenship itself was not valid (such as obtained through fraud).
While the specific acts committed by a citizen which could lead to the revocation of citizenship are extremely serious, the concept at stake is whether the government can prescribe criminality as a ground for revoking citizenship. If so, if yes it can, then conceptually the government could make the commission of other crimes grounds for revoking citizenship. And the question then would be what limitation is there, if any. Could "serious criminality" be grounds, much like it is for revoking Permanent Resident status now (which merely requires the commission of an offence for which six months or more of imprisionment is imposed)?
My sense is that the government, in contrast, is arguing, at least in large part, that the particular conduct prescribed as grounds for revocation are not merely extremely serious, but are of a character which in effect constitute a renunciation of citizenship. To the extent that acts of treason are now grounds, this argument probably has a great deal of weight. Whether acts of terrorism elsewhere in the world (not in Canad or otherwise aimed at Canadians) is the sort of act which could be construed to be a renunciation of citizenship is . . . well probably something the courts will decide. I suspect there is a significant chance this could be a deciding question, whether the conduct prescribed as grounds for revoking citizenship, based on acts committed while a citizen, in effect amount to a renunciation of citizenship.
I say this because an argument based on the serious of the conduct prescribed opens the door to revoking citizenship for other serious crimes, like murder, and if that, then conceptually Parliament could prescribe "serious criminality" as grounds, again much like the grounds for which PR status can be taken away.
Aonther potentially key element: Disparity between citizens with and without dual citizenship.
There is nothing inherently unconstitutional or contrary to the Charter in the government distinguishing its treatment of individuals based on classifications generally. Discrimination is the norm, the rule. Convicted felons, for example, are treated very differently, to the point of being held in confinement.
The primary question is whether the classification leading to disparate treatment is based on a restricted or suspect category or class. Classifications based on race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and such, are generally prohibited. Other classifications may be suspect, such as age. My sense is that the fact a classification is based on a restricted or suspect category will not absolutely preclude the government from treating individuals differently based on the classification if there is a sufficiently strong and legitimate government purpose which cannot be accomplished otherwise. That is, suspect classifications may be allowed if there is a compelling government interest and need. Sorting through these issues usually demands an understanding of Canadian constitutional and Charter jurisprudence far above that of even most jurists, let alone those not law-trained.
The revocation of citizenship provisions implemented by Bill C-24 do distinguish, and treat differently, citizens based on whether or not they have citizenship in another country. My sense is that this is at least a suspect classification, one which would require the government to show a compelling interest and need to justify. Since I am not a Canadian constitutional law expert, I cannot guess how the courts will rule regarding this.
There is a backside to this issue: law and treaties which prohibit Canada from making an individual stateless. This does not prohibit Canada from revoking citizenship for a person who committed fraud in obtaining citizenship because Canada is not making such a person stateless -- such a person never really had valid Canadian citizenship. But this would preclude Canada from revoking otherwise valid Canadian citizenship for a person who would be rendered stateless as a result. Hence, for the provisions which can result in the revocation of citizenship based on acts committed while a citizen, Bill C-24 limits this to those with citizenship in another country, since by the revoking of their Canadian citizenship they are not rendered stateless.
The third big issue is about the process, the procedure:
Bill C-24 made substantial changes to the procedure for revoking citizenship. There are a number of safeguards, based largely on the availability of judicial review, built into the process. Thus, my sense is that the fact that for some grounds there is now no preliminary Judicial review, is probably not something the courts will summarily rule out. This, I think, is something more likely to be a more contested issue in specific individual cases. But here again, this is the domain of constitutional and Charter experts.
Even if the government were to lose across the board on these issues:
That is, even if the court finds these provisions in Bill C-24 to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, it is very, very unlikely this will have any impact at all on the validity of other provisions in Bill C-24.
I am quite confident that there is virtually no chance at all that the entire Bill will be deemed invalid. I do not think anyone is even making such a case in any formal sense or venue.
There are other problems, other issues, with the provisions of Bill C-24.
Many other issues will arise in the course of individual cases. Contested issues will involve matters ranging from the interpretation to the application of many of the Act's specific provisions.
The "intent to continue residing in Canada" provision will almost certainly be the subject of litigation eventually. The questions raised will include whether it is a valid condition (probably is) and what it means (including its effect on the scope of what is material information).
But none of these will affect the overall validity of Bill C-24, and the vast majority of them will be relatively narrow decisions regarding how specific portions of the law apply in specific circumstances. This litigation will take many, many years to arise and be resolved. These issues do not appear to be a part of the current challenge by Galatti.
