Out of curiosity, where did you see that?
The closest I've found is this,
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigratio...ttees/secu-september-19-2024/citizenship.html
> Any application in which criminality is suspected must only be assessed and decided upon by a Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03) who has received training and passed a delegation exam related to how to assess, process and/or refer cases with suspected criminality.
I cannot comment (don't know) about the internal decision-maker structure/hierarchy within IRCC (I have no clue, for example, what it means to be a "
Level-2 delegated decision maker (a PM-03)" beyond that described in the source you link), let alone any correlations with the processing of citizenship applications.
Moreover, frankly, I was not acquainted with the House "
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security" and its work in regards to processing citizenship applications in particular. And I still find it difficult to grasp the import of the content posted under Corporate information / Transparency . . . but even if these webpages (there are several others) are merely reports from the committee for the benefit of the full Parliament, there's a ton of interesting stuff in all that for those trying to understand more about how high complex (security or criminality questions, perhaps contested facts questions including those affecting verification of physical presence) applications are processed (what the government allows the public to see, less than those affected want by a lot, but an illuminating lot nonetheless) and the internal decision-making structure in particular. Some interesting reading material for those interested leading to more than a few rabbit-holes through the fence, so to say, so the link is appreciated.
Also see sidebar below.
My criminality is passed but it is still PM 03 ... it is under location section of GCMS Notes
My background is pending because of CSIS Screening and LPP is pending too but Criminality is passed by RCMP
I am not much help here. Best I can offer is that you know yourself, full history and all, so you should have a good sense as to . . .
-- whether you should pay a lawyer to dive into your details, confidentially, but only if and when you want; or
-- whether there is nothing to worry about, in your history to now, so even if you have to wait some months, into a year maybe (hopefully not anywhere near that) longer than others, you will get the opportunity to take the oath.
But you could help here (it seems to me) if you further explain what you know about your GCMS showing "
PM 03" (including other discussions about PM 03 in this forum).
I know no more than what the SECU September 19, 2024 information shows, indicating that there are these Level-2 delegated decision makers, classified PM-03, who "
are equipped to perform additional assessments and to use enhanced analysis techniques for cases determined to require additional scrutiny," which is why (according to the SECU information) applications in which criminality is suspected can only be assessed and decided by this level of decision makers . . . inviting curiosity as to what other kinds of applications are also referred to this level of decision maker.
Sidebar (regarding earlier what is "non-routine," and what does it mean discussion):
It seems that recently IRCC has been referring more to "
complex" or "
high complex" application processing rather than "
non-routine," which should help some applicants distinguish their situation better than just the "
non-routine" description has, assuming that applicants will be given accurate information as to whether their application is complex or high complex, the latter being more problematic, and involving a significantly longer processing time.
"
Non-routine" in contrast described an application that involved any additional processing actions in addition to the mainstream steps/tasks that all adult applications go through. So even a basic, no big deal fingerprint request would make an application non-routine, even though its impact on processing times might be minimal. At the other end of the spectrum, applications referred for a full CBSA/NSSD or CSIS investigation, which could add many months or a year or more to the processing timeline, were likewise non-routine applications. So this non-routine description offered very little insight into how the application was progressing through the process.
Has not been confirmed yet (that I have seen), but my sense is the shift to distinguishing complex and high complex applications flows from or is part of the implementation of more automated assessment facilitating less eyes-on processing for a high percentage of applications. This is likely to reduce processing times for a large number of applicants. How it will affect the remainder (likewise no small number), those determined to be complex or high complex, is yet to be seen.
