Decision to approve or grant citizenship is
always contingent until the oath is actually taken.
At the least, with some exceptions (such as for same or next day oath scheduling) there will be another GCMS clearance-check between when the decision is made and the oath ceremony takes place, which includes a criminal name-records check; moreover, applicants are usually required to verify, in writing, no prohibitions during this time, typically by submitting a signed form attendant the oath ceremony check-in.
As I noted, the Decision-made is
contingent. And it really cannot work any other way since the applicant (a "citizenship candidate" once the approval decision is made) must continue to meet the qualifications right up to taking the oath (this is specifically mandated by statute),
AND actually taking the oath is a formal requirement as well (with some narrow exceptions), so the applicant cannot meet all the requirements until the oath is actually taken.
That noted, as simple as the procedures are, as bureaucratic procedures can tend to go, there is a lot going on
under-the-hood, so to say.
Yep. But again, there is a lot going on
under-the-hood, so to say, and it can get a little complicated. This said, while some applicants have been approved and scheduled for the oath, but then not allowed to take the oath and subsequently subject to this or that non-routine processing, including some getting RQ at that late stage,
this appears to be rare and perhaps very rare (rare enough that some instances of this have gotten media coverage).
Decision-making overview:
A general outline of the process is described in the instruction guide and in general PDIs (Program Delivery Instructions), for which see, respectively:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/applications/guides/CIT0002ETOC.asp#CIT0002E8 (see "what happens next" in the instruction guide)
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/roles.asp (PDI "Citizenship: Decision-making procedures")
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/justification.asp (Citizenship: Justifying the decision)
For just a sample of possible tangents in the processing, see PDIs like:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/without.asp (Decision-making without the personal appearance of citizenship applicants)
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/interviews.asp (Citizenship: Interviewing adult applicants)
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/cit/admin/decision/judge.asp (Referring applications to a citizenship judge)
However, those sources only provide a general outline, which is complicated enough but in many respects superficial, and to an extent also somewhat cryptic. For example, there are various references to the "Citizenship Application Record of Decision Card" (CIT 0065). This document appears to be among those considered confidential. It obviously is the document which shows what decisions have been made, when, and probably to some extent why. We do not know what is in this form.
Among other confidential documents which play a huge role in processing citizenship applications, there is the FRC, the File Requirements Checklist (or whatever name its current version has) and, for non-routine cases referred to a Citizenship Judge, the FPAT, the File Preparation and Analysis Template (or, again, whatever the current version of the referral to a CJ is named).
We have a copy of the 2012 version of the FRC (which appears to have been accidently disclosed to a client who then, in turn, shared it on the Internet), which provides a great deal of information relative to which a lot of ATI requests have resulted in the disclosure of internal memos and such illuminating many (but way less than all) aspects of how this was employed. In conjunction with prior Operational Manuals, Operational Bulletins, and including the big one, OB-407 (not publicly posted but various redacted versions have been obtained through ATI applications and are available on the Internet).
Thus, with more than a little concerted effort, including ongoing research accessing many sources, there is a lot we know but a lot we do not know.
Without revisiting all that has been previously and extensively discussed in this forum, and to a larger extent in at least one other forum, about the process going on
under-the-hood, so to say, for now I will offer this:
There are three clearances:
-- GCMS
-- RCMP
-- CSIS
The RCMP and CSIS clearances are, of course, done by the RCMP and CSIS respectively, and are also respectively criminal and security checks, but not exclusively so. IRCC in Sydney makes a referral to these respective organizations for the clearance. This is done contemporaneous with opening the application file. The respective organization submits, when it is done, the clearance to the local office (I suspect the process is actually electronic but am not sure, so it probably goes to certain fields in the GCMS, fields which are
NOT included in a report-copy generated to give clients in response to ATIP requests).
Note too that the RCMP clearance, done by the RCMP, is more extensive and probing than a name-records check (at the least, for example, screening against records of persons suspected of crimes even if not charged). Again, the GCMS clearance encompasses a records-name check either into the RCMP names-record database or version provided for CBSA and IRCC.
A GCMS check is required each and every time any substantive action or decision is made on the application. So there are multiple GCMS checks on the applicant as the application proceeds through the process. Things can still slip through (there was a case a few years ago involving a person approved and allowed to take the oath, but who had been convicted of something like attempted murder between the test and interview and the oath ceremony . . . CIC lost an appeal of its effort to revoke his citizenship . . . a case which influenced the implementation of the current strict reverification of no prohibitions procedures), but generally this is intended to catch things like a PoE FOSS alert or a criminal arrest, right up to immediately prior to the taking of the oath.
And, again, the RCMP or CSIS clearances sometimes need to be updated, and again that is usually due to their expiration or something new triggering the need for an updated clearance.
Getting much more into what goes on behind the curtain than this (or going back to my original metaphor, seeing what goes on
under-the-hood) is very difficult, since this aspect of processing is considered confidential, and much of it is very strictly concealed from public view.
The vast majority of applicants sail through the process smoothly, no diversions, no non-routine processing, no delays. Indeed, overall, for the last several years Statistics Canada shows that 93 percent of all citizenship application outcomes are successful. Obviously, a large percentage of these sail easily through the process.
Which means overall that most applicants (meaning more than half) can easily predict that they will become a citizen in relatively short order
once they apply, and more confidently once they attend and pass the knowledge of Canada test. No need to even see eCas show "Decision Made."
But the
number of applicants for whom there is a diversion on the path to citizenship is quite high. It is a small percentage, but a small percentage of hundreds of thousands is a number well into the thousands.
Most diversions from the routine track will, indeed, occur prior to the Decision Made. So, the number of applicants for whom problems arise after there is a decision made is relatively, comparatively less and probably a lot less.
It warrants emphasizing that generally applicants who are at risk for something going awry (either a little, resulting in some delay, like a CSIS clearance which historically can take a long time, or something big like a prohibition or fraud inquiry), after the decision made step,
should already be aware they have some risks in this regard. Applicants know their circumstances. Some have real risks for what usually are rather apparent reasons.
Also note, there appears to be a significant number of applicants sidetracked after decision made but before being scheduled for the oath (again, most of whom I am confident are aware they are at risk for this). In contrast, the number of applicants scheduled for the oath whose application is sidetracked, so they are not allowed to take the oath and are then involved in further processing, is what appears to be rare.