Travel History
- Thread starter i6evx5e8
- Start date
Not sure if I was clear to explain the question. Let's take example.
1. Say, Person X went to France in 2018 using country A passport.
2. Person X goes to France again in 2022, but using their Country B passport.
Question is, will France (or any other country it may be) know that Person X visited France earlier just by looking their new passport.
1. Say, Person X went to France in 2018 using country A passport.
2. Person X goes to France again in 2022, but using their Country B passport.
Question is, will France (or any other country it may be) know that Person X visited France earlier just by looking their new passport.
That is what biometrics are for. A different nationality won’t change finger prints and iris scans, as well as your place/date of birth.
But most countries don't scan your fingers when you enter or leave. Even country like US takes finger prints either first time you enter or once in certain period. They don't scan the fingers every time.
OP's question seems to be valid but answers not seems to be serious.
Everything is linked at the back end. If that wasn’t the case there would not have been cases of mistaken identities being flagged on no-fly lists. I don’t think anyone can convincingly claim that countries do not know if you have travelled before on a different citizenship.
The moment a passport is scanned on arrival, I am certain it pulls up matching / similar records to check for red flags.
Let those people who have such a history worry about it. Other (and honest) people have no worries about such matters.
GuyanaGirl
Hero Member
- Jul 4, 2016
- 313
- Visa Office......
- Kitchener
- App. Filed.......
- July, 20th 2016
- Med's Request
- Upfront
The process doesn’t start and end at the immigration counter.
There are systems in place in every country that will be able to connect people to prior nationalities, travel history and passports.
Before you even land in your destination country , they have everything they need to know about you before you step off that flight.
There are systems in place in every country that will be able to connect people to prior nationalities, travel history and passports.
Before you even land in your destination country , they have everything they need to know about you before you step off that flight.
GuyanaGirl
Hero Member
- Jul 4, 2016
- 313
- Visa Office......
- Kitchener
- App. Filed.......
- July, 20th 2016
- Med's Request
- Upfront
It’s unfair to say only dishonest people will have worry with this question .Let those people who have such a history worry about it. Other (and honest) people have no worries about such matters.
Post by @GuyanaGirl largely covers it . . . though I would quibble just a little with "they have everything they need to know about you before you step off that flight." Quite sure Port-of-Entry officials do not know "everything" of importance in regards to many travelers. Moreover, each country has its own laws, rules, policies, practices, and overriding all that, their own capabilities relative to maintaining and accessing information. What the PoE officials know about a traveler when the traveler arrives can vary a great deal depending on which country it is.
In terms of "travel history" in particular, obviously most PoE officials will have access at most to a limited amount of the traveler's travel history. I assume the question is really about the extent to which a particular country connects a specific individual to that individual's travel history into and/or out of that country. Not the individual's travel history into or out of other countries. Which again brings up how different the practices and capabilities are for different countries. Notwithstanding the ties between France (cited as an example in the query) and Mali, there are undoubtedly significant differences in what information is captured, stored, maintained, and accessible relative to travelers arriving in one versus the other; there are undoubtedly significant differences between countries like the U.S. and Canada, for example, and countries like Yemen, Sudan and Somalia. And then there are places like China, Dubai, Korea, where the nature and extent of personal information captured, monitored, and accessible, can be significantly more extensive and intrusive. In other words, like so many things, IT VARIES.
Nonetheless most countries have the capability of connecting individuals to themselves, within the scope of information that country captures and maintains, regardless which travel document the individual uses to travel to and enter that particular country. There are huge gaps in this of course. Typically exploited by those engaged to some extent in concealing information if not involved in outright fraud.
On the other hand, the information technology connecting embedded biometric information in many passports (although no where near all countries' passports) is continually expanding, along with complex information-sharing protocols, much framed by treaties but quite a lot also accessible through intelligence sharing arrangements that are more or less confidential or secret. So a lot also depends on just what passport the individual is using, some passports connected to more extensive databases containing personal information than others.
The example "France" also warrants noting that individuals can travel into and out of France from neighbouring EU countries without the entry or exit being captured or stored in French government databases. Did I mention that government access to traveler information VARIES from country-to-country?
Meanwhile I: While it may not have been intended to be a genuine or sincere comment, it is true that an individual's travel history is their travel history, it is past tense, and in the context of what border, immigration, or other law enforcement officials might be interested in, a person's travel history does not change. Here again the capability of a particular country to connect and access information about an individual's personal history will vary widely, noting that this capability is generally more extensive and comprehensive in regards to information about that person in that particular country (the UK is not likely to have much if any information about an individual's travel history between Canada and the U.S., for example, but be able to connect information about that person's travel into the UK despite the use of different travel documents, including travel documents from different countries).
Meanwhile II: Why? matters. Let's just say, for someone traveling to China say, probably best to assume the officials there know their travel history in China regardless what travel document they are using. Context matters.
I was waiting for this reply, honestly.
The intent of this question was declarative, and not discreet. If someone has a long and extensive "lawful" entry/exit record with DHS or Border Force, that person will definitely want that to be considered while seeking entry into the US or the UK while traveling on a fresh passport having different nationality - it is a matter of credibility. Because no country will ever want an illegal / unlawful person staying in their country, and past records help establishing that credibility.
On the other hand, personally I do not care much about what a fraudster will worry about. Our paths do not cross. So, they are excluded from the umbrella of my question.
Also, for many countries' passports, old passport number is recorded. But again, that is out of scope of this discussion.
Thanks!! Any more insights?
I suspect you are overthinking things in regards to border control screening of a Canadian citizen seeking entry into countries like the U.S. or the UK . . . I do not know much about UK policies or practices, but for entry into the U.S., those authorities will generally have immediate access to sufficient history of an individual's travel into the U.S., and associated status, that fact alone will be a dominate factor . . . recognizing that absent a history of travel into the U.S., otherwise, yeah, or so it seems anyway, the U.S. tends to discriminate if an individual was or continues to be a citizen of certain countries, despite their becoming a Canadian citizen and presenting a Canadian passport (and despite some redacted information on the face of the passport). But it is not as if the details in travel history into the U.S. will matter as much as the fact of there being a travel history and any negative events or decisions related to the individual. Which information will not necessarily be but nonetheless nearly always will be connected to the individual regardless what travel document, from whatever country, the traveler uses.
Distinguishing border control screening for countries like China . . . a rather different tale.
Beyond that . . . perhaps a Meanwhile III . . . it is worth noting and emphasizing the difference between what personal information that border, immigration, and other law enforcement officials CAN access versus what is routinely seen or screened. This is of course connected to and dependent on what personal information is captured, by which government body, since access to information depends on that information having been captured (historically a lot of individual travel history was minimally captured, and going back a little further, much of it only captured in passport stamps), and maintained. If the information was not captured, or not maintained, there is of course no access to that information.
But even in terms of captured and maintained information, there are variable portals of access. Some of the portals or access-paths are restricted. Which here too there is great variability from country-to-country. Indeed, there is so much variation it hardly makes any sense to wrestle with this subject outside the context of a particular country. Note, for example, this can be incredibly complex, since there are numerous countries like Canada which have highly structured information-access regulation within the government, related to measures to protect privacy, but also which have implemented information capturing and storage that is truly profoundly extensive and intensive, deeply intrusive . . . that is, while Canada has extensive regulatory rules limiting access to personal information (even within a single agency), Canada also has captured and keeps vast amounts of detailed individual information.
Which leads back to the observation about the difference between what CAN be accessed and what, in a particular situation or transaction, is typically accessed. Applications for some kinds of visas, for example, will trigger more extensive screening of database information than, say, a PoE examination attendant application to enter the country as a visitor.
(Note: I am disregarding the more extreme paranoia perspectives which apprehend "the government" captures everything, knows everything, and uses it all; noted with the caveat that it is utterly amazing how much more personal information is captured and maintained these days, and not only accessible but actually accessed, compared to when I was much younger, even back when I was middle-aged. Further noting that it appears private and corporate entities may be capturing a lot more personal information than governments, and it appears that trend is accelerating. Smile, your every detail is being electronically culled. And this information will be sold to just about any bidder, not just the highest.)
In Canada much access to personal information in the government's numerous silos of data, including databases in databases, is tiered depending on a kind of need-to-know or triage scheme. For example, not just any IRCC agent or officer can go into their computer and pull up an individual client's CBSA travel history. Some of the structured access is tied to discretionary decision-making, individual officials having the authority to probe a level deeper if they decide there is a reason or cause without requiring authority or permission from another official, and often without this decision being subject to any review (they still need to have a reason, just that no one else is generally monitoring their decision-making). Some access, in contrast, requires overt permission from a supervising official. Some types of access require permission from the individual UNLESS there is an overriding investigatory cause. This is just a highly generalized, rather superficial outline, referring to an intricately complicated matrix of access-controls interfaced with the highly complex matrix of information-capturing methods . . . much of which is behind the curtain behind closed doors, more or less strictly confidential, especially when there is any investigatory purpose implicated.
So here too CONTEXT looms large. Going back to the example of an IRCC official accessing an individual's CBSA travel history. A particular official may have the authority to access clients' CBSA travel history generally, but still not be authorized to access it EXCEPT in certain circumstances. That is, it would be highly unusual for any IRCC official to have authority to randomly or arbitrarily access a client's CBSA travel history. Typically there must be a legitimate reason, and depending on the reason there may be further limitations on if and when access is authorized. Again, some access will require the individual's permission, but if and when there is a particular investigatory cause or need, the individual's permission is not required. CBSA officers, particularly those screening the traveler at a PoE, have broader, less restrictive access to a client's travel history information, but even they do not have unfettered access (allowing that just like law enforcement generally, more than a little unauthorized probing for family or friend likely goes on, unfortunately).
Nonetheless, in the context of your query, all that seems well beyond the overthinking things horizon.